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Abstract
The present study examined the relationships of
politics in appraisal and political use of appraisal to
ratee attitudes and desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

Hypotheses were developed from research on

politics in appraisal, the feedback process model of
Ilgen, Fisher, and Taylor, 1979, and equity theory
(Adams, 1965).

Negative relationships between politics

and dependent variables were predicted.
were conducted.

Two studies

Study 1 used 97 professionals in two

organizations to test the effects of hypothetical
political use of appraisal on their attitudes and
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

Study 2 used

145 professionals in two organizations to investigate
the relationship of politics in performance appraisal
to ratee atitudes and desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

Results of both studies generally supported

the hypothesized negative relationship between
political distortion of ratings and ratee attitudes and
desire to respond to feedback.

A tentative model of

the effects of politics in performance appraisal was
presented and implications for researchers and

viii

practitioners were presented and directions for future
research were discussed.

ix

The Effects of Politically Biased Performance
Appraisal on Ratee Job Attitudes and Desire to Respond
to Feedback
The appraisal of employee performance has been a
research concern of applied psychologists for over 70
years (Landy & Farr, 1983).

Performance evaluation

remains a vital topic in the organizational sciences
literature.
journals

For example, several applied psychology

(e.g., Personnel Psychology. Journal of

Applied Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes) devote significant portions of
each issue to articles on its study and practice.
Performance appraisal is also of concern to
businesses and organizations and plays a major role in
personnel and organizational decisions
1983).

(Landy & Farr,

Its importance is highlighted by the number of

organizations that practice it.

Locher and Teel

(1988) estimate that over 92 percent of all U.S.
organizations use some form of formal employee
performance evaluation.
Performance appraisal is used by organizations for
many purposes.

Performance ratings are used for

validating employee selection procedures, making
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compensation and promotion decisions, establishing
training program objectives, monitoring employee
performance, and providing feedback to employees
(Cleveland, Murphy, & Williams, 1989; Landy & Farr,
1983).

It is seen by practitioners as a significant

means of improving performance and productivity of
both individuals and organizations
(Longenecker, 1989).
Performance appraisal continues to be an integral
part of the work of human resource practitioners.
Given its widespread use and importance to
organizational functioning, it is not surprising that
it is a major topic of study in personnel and
organizational psychology.

The present research

attempts to add to this body of research knowledge by
assessing the effects of political bias in rating.
The present study will use both survey and simulation
techniques in a field setting to investigate the
relationship between politically biased use of
performance appraisal and ratee job attitudes and
desire to respond to feedback.

Past Research in Performance Appraisal;
Increasing Accuracy
There are numerous means of assessing employee
performance including production and personnel
records, self-ratings, and peer ratings.

Despite the

numerous methods of evaluation available to
practitioners,

the most widely used means of

performance appraisal is supervisory judgment of
performance (Landy & Farr, 1983).

These methods call

for supervisors to provide ratings of subordinate
performance.

Ratings are made relative to other

employees and/or to some pre-determined standard
of performance.
Research on judgmental appraisal methods has
focused on reducing unintentional errors.

These

biases include halo error, leniency/severity bias, and
central tendency bias.

A variety of approaches to

reducing these errors has been examined.

For example,

various rating instruments (e.g., trait scales,
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales, Behavioral
Observation Scales, Mixed Standard Scales) have been
developed and studied (for a review see Landy & Farr,
1983).

More recently, researchers have focused on the

cognitive processes involved in making ratings of
performance (e.g., Feldman, 1981).
Additionally, rater training programs (e.g., rater
error training, rater accuracy training, frame of
reference training) have been developed and researched
(for a review see Smith, 1981).

The major purpose of

these instruments and programs has been to increase
accuracy in rating.
Most of the past research assumes that raters are
motivated to provide accurate ratings of employee
performance.

If they are incapable of providing

accurate ratings, it is thought to be due to a lack of
training or due to problems with the rating
instruments.

This research further assumes that true

performance evaluations for ratees exist (i.e., "true
scores").

There are numerous definitions of and

issues concerning accuracy and "true score" (Sulsky &
Balzer, 1988).

However, nearly all definitions of

accuracy assume that true scores do exist and that
inaccuracy is due to the combined effects of random
error and systematic error (i.e., bias).
Past research has assumed that raters attempt to
give ratings which are as accurate as possible.

Any

inaccuracy has been assumed to be due to unintentional
bias.

Banks and Murphy (1985) contend that the

question of the raters' willingness to convey accurate
appraisals has been largely ignored by researchers.
Banks and Murphy suggest that the assumption that
raters are motivated to provide accurate ratings of
subordinate performance in organizations may
be unrealistic.
Recent Research in Performance Appraisal:
Rater Motivation
The issue of the rater's motivation in rating
behavior has been recently addressed by a number of
authors (Banks & Murphy, 1985; Longenecker, 1989;
Bernardin & Villanova, 1986).

These authors posit

that raters in organizations are rarely motivated to
provide accurate appraisals.
raters

Further, in some cases,

may be strongly motivated to provide

inaccurate ratings (Longenecker et al., 1987).
These various motivations may not be present in
typical laboratory performance appraisal research,
where raters and ratees usually have no vested
interest in the ratings given or received.

Further,

raters and ratees are unlikely to have any subsequent

contact with each other following the experiment
(Ilgen & Favero, 1985).
In contrast to the laboratory, performance
appraisal in organizations has a number of significant
implications for both the rater and the ratee.

For

example, raters in organizations usually have
subsequent interactions with ratees, and their ratings
are often subject to review by their superiors (Ilgen
&

Favero, 1985).

It is apparent, therefore, that

performance appraisal in organizations has significant
consequences for raters and ratees.
One significant consequence of performance
appraisal in organizations is its effect on ratee
compensation and/or promotion (Mohrman, Resnick-West,
& Lawler, 1989).

Additionally, performance appraisal

is used to assist in employee counseling and
development.

However, in achieving these ends,

performance appraisal creates a written document which
can follow the ratee throughout his or her career with
the organization (Longenecker et al., 1988).
Recent research suggests that raters take the
consequences of their ratings into account when
completing performance evaluations.

For example,

results from a study by Longenecker et al. (1987)
suggested that raters are more lenient when their
ratings will be used to determine compensation.
Zedeck and Cascio (1982) found that the ratings given
identical performance differed, depending on the
purpose for the rating (research vs. administrative).
Ratings to be used for administrative purposes tended
to be more lenient than ratings made for research
purposes.

Research by Williams, DeNisi, Blencoe, and

Cafferty (1985) suggests that appraisal for feedback
and development purposes is less prone to leniency
than appraisal for administrative purposes.

It is

apparent from this body of research that rating
purpose has an effect on performance ratings.
Cleveland et al.

(1989), in summarizing research

on the multiple purposes of performance appraisals,
concluded that raters consider the ultimate impact of
the ratings given when completing performance
appraisals.

Further, interviews of managers by

Longenecker et al.

(1987) suggested that raters

consider the multiple purposes for ratings prior to
completing appraisal forms.

According to Longenecker

et al ., raters determine the consequences of each

purpose and complete written appraisals with the most
important consequences in mind.

All other purposes

are thus de-emphasized.
Politically Motivated Rating Behavior
Recent research (e.g., Cleveland et al., 1989;
Longenecker et al., 1987; Banks & Murphy,

1985) has

indicated that raters in organizations take the
consequences of their ratings into account when
completing performance appraisals.

It is possible

that raters intentionally distort ratings to affect
the

appraisal consequences for themselves and/or

their subordinates (Longenecker et al., 1987).
Research by Longenecker et al. suggests that raters in
organizations may have numerous motivations for
distorting ratings.

Raters may distort ratings to

avoid conflict with employees, to motivate
subordinates, and to affect compensation/promotion
(Longenecker,

1991).

In in-depth interviews of sixty executives,
Longenecker et al.

(1987) found that motivations of

raters, precipitated by political factors within the
organization, may be largely responsible for many
"errors" in rating.

According to these authors, past

research assuming accuracy as the rater1s primary goal
"...ignores one important point.

Appraisals take

place in an organizational environment that is
anything but completely rational, straightforward, or
dispassionate.

In this environment, accuracy does not

seem to matter to managers, quite so much as
discretion, effectiveness, or more importantly,
survival"

(Longenecker et al., p. 184).

Managers noted that political considerations are
nearly always part of the appraisal process.

They

believed that factors other than the employees' actual
performance influence the ratings given by appraisers
(Longenecker et al., 1987).

Additionally, managers

said organizational culture has a great deal of
influence on the use of politics in appraisal.
Further, managers believed that increased political
use of appraisals was precipitated by a lack of top
management support for and use of appraisals.
Additionally, managers believed that a lack of
appraisal training, and the view that appraisal is an
unnecessary bureaucratic exercise, led to politically
motivated rating distortion (Longenecker, 1989).

Managers noted that political culture tends to
cascade down through organizations.

Political use of

appraisals at upper levels of the organization was
thought to lead to political use at subsequent lower
levels (Longenecker, 1989).

Additionally, managers

indicated that they did not receive adequate
performance feedback themselves.

They felt that this

was due to the political culture discouraging
performance feedback (Longenecker, 1988).

Managers

indicated that this lack of feedback led to feelings
of increased stress and role ambiguity.
Managers1 Rationales for Inflating/Deflating Ratings
Managers in the study by Longenecker (1989) said
that there are many reasons for distorting ratings.
Further, they said that these political reasons
produce an inflation or deflation of
subordinate ratings.
Research by Longenecker (1989) and Longenecker et
al.

(1987) suggested that managers may inflate

subordinate ratings for a number of reasons, including

1)

A belief that accurate ratings would reduce
the subordinate's motivation and performance;

11
2)

A desire to increase employee eligibility for
merit increases;

3)

A wish to avoid the creation of a negative
permanent record which could harm the
employee's career;

4)

The need to protect good performers whose
performance deficits are due to
personal problems;

5)

A

desire to reward good recent performance;

6)

The wish

to reward employees showing great

effort despite poor results;
7)

A desire to avoid confrontation with
problem employees;

8)

An attempt to get a disliked employee
promoted out of their department;

9)

A

strong positive feeling about the employee;

10)

A

desire to keep performance problems within

the department;
11)

A desire to make themselves look good in the
eyes of their superiors.

Prior research has suggested that ratings may be
inflated due to one or more of the above-cited

rationales.

For example, research by Larson (1986)

suggested that managers are reluctant to give negative
feedback.

Additionally, Cardy and Dobbins (1982)

found that liking for the ratee was associated with
rating leniency.

Although managers said that they are

reluctant to deflate ratings due to legal, ethical and
motivational consequences, negative distortions do
happen.

Managers in the Longenecker (1989) and

Longenecker et al.

(1987) research cited the following

rationales for deflating subordinate ratings:
1)

To scare better performance out of an
employee (e.g., a "kick in the pants");

2)

To punish a difficult employee;

3)

To encourage a problem employee

4)

To create a strong case for a

to quit;

planned termination;
5)

To minimize the amount of merit increase an
employee receives;

6)

To comply with organizational pressures
discouraging high ratings.

Additionally, managers indicated that written
appraisal (for administrative purposes) can be more

positive or negative than spoken feedback given to
employees at the time of the appraisal.

Managers may

indeed inflate written ratings but give more accurate
verbal feedback.

Alternatively, managers may deflate

ratings to comply with organizational pressures
against

giving high ratings which would lead to

increased compensation.

In these cases managers may

also give more accurate verbal feedback (Longenecker
et a l . , 1987).
It is apparent that managers view performance
appraisal, at least in part, as a discretionary
management tool used to achieve personal and
organizational goals (Longenecker & Ludwig, 1990).
Managers take the consequences of appraisals into
account prior to making ratings and then may distort
ratings to bring about desired consequences (Cleveland
et al., 1989; Longenecker, 1989).

Research (e.g.,

Longenecker, 1989; Longenecker et al., 1987) suggests
that managers believe that they have the ability to
make fairly accurate ratings.

Further, this research

suggests that bias (systematic error)
part, intentional.

is, at least in
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Recent research has begun to study the possibility
that raters intentionally distort ratings to achieve
personal and organizational goals.

The organizational

and political pressures that influence rating behavior
are now attracting research interest (Longenecker et
al., 1987).
Consequences of Politically Biased Feedback:

A

Research Gap
Whereas recent research suggests that managers may
distort the ratings and feedback given to employees
(Longenecker, 1989;

Longenecker et al., 1987), the

consequences of the distortions in terms of employee
motivation, trust, self-esteem, and development have
not been investigated.
Previous research (e.g., Bannister, 1986;
Florin-Thuma & Boudreau, 1987; Guzzo, Jette, &
Katzell, 1985; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Ilgen &
Moore, 1987; Kopelman, 1986; Landy, Farr, & Jacobs,
1982) has shown an association between performance
feedback (and feedback characteristics) and subsequent
employee

motivation and job attitudes.

When managers

distort ratings in an attempt to motivate employees
(and/or achieve other goals), it is possible that the

effects on employees are not the desired ones.
Politically biased performance feedback could lead to
reduced motivation and negative job attitudes in
ratees.

Ilgen

et al.,

(1979) present a model of

performance feedback which demonstrates how feedback
can affect motivation and performance.

This model,

along with other relevant research, will be presented
in the following section to show how politically
biased feedback could affect the feedback-motivation
and feedback-job attitude relationships.
Performance Feedback and Employee Motivation
Performance feedback can come from various
sources; however, the most significant source of
feedback in organizations is primarily an annual or
semi-annual formal performance review conducted by an
employee's immediate supervisor (Landy & Farr, 1983).
The usual result of this appraisal is a document
indicating how well the employee has performed over
the past year or half-year.

The appraisal is usually

used in making administrative decisions concerning
compensation and promotion (Landy & Farr).
In addition to its use for administrative
functions, performance appraisal/feedback is intended

16
to give employees an idea of how well they are
performing and to help them set goals for future
performance (Latham & Wexley, 1981).

The positive

relation between goal setting and motivation is well
established by empirical literature (for a review, see
Locke, Shaw, Saari, &

Latham, 1981).

Employees use

feedback concerning their performance to set goals for
future performance (Locke, 1970).
Previous literature suggests that accurate
feedback is a necessary condition for goal setting to
take place (Latham & Yukl, 1975).

According to goal

theory (Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 1981), motivation
(and thus performance) will increase if feedback leads
to the setting of specific challenging goals.
Larson (1989) posits that feedback is so essential
that without it goal setting will have little, if any,
impact on sustained performance.

Additionally, Tziner

and Latham (1989) found that feedback followed by goal
setting leads to increased satisfaction and
organizational commitment.
The probability that feedback will lead to goal
setting is increased if it is perceived by the ratee
as accurate (Latham & Wexley, 1981).

In the absence
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of feedback, or if the feedback is not accepted,
motivation will be reduced (Campion & Lord, 1982).
Research on the link between feedback and performance
as a process (Ilgen et al., 1979) offers insight into
the role of feedback in employee motivation
and performance.
The feedback process model of Ilgen et al.
(see Figure 1) posits that feedback,

(1979)

if accepted, will

lead to motivation to respond, which will lead to goal
setting, which will then lead to performance.

As

shown in Figure 1, employee acceptance of feedback is
essential to the feedback— > motivation— > goal
setting— > performance process.

The model

suggests that a lack of feedback or lack of feedback
acceptance will lead to reduced ratee motivation, and
thus, reduced performance.
Ilgen et al.,

(1979) delineated a number of

variables which can affect employee acceptance of
feedback.

Research concerning these variables and the

potential implications of politically motivated

In d iv id u a l d llln im ic n cliniticln tfB lfn B o t l o d p l n i i l

P m r n tv p il I
lnndljm.lt I

^

|fgS5e }* Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor's (1 9 7 9 )
feedback process model.
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appraisal on feedback acceptance are presented in the
following sections.
Acceptance of Feedback
Assuming feedback is given, the feedback source
and the feedback message are important determinants of
its acceptance.
Feedback Source.

As previously discussed,

feedback in organizations comes from many sources.
Feedback can come from supervisors (Heneman, 1986),
self-assessments
1984), peers

(Levine, 1980), subordinates

(Mount,

(McEvoy & Buller, 1987), and the work

itself (e.g., production records; Heneman, 198 6).
Feedback also can come in different forms
written vs. spoken; formal vs. informal).

(e.g.,

In the

context of organizational performance appraisal, the
source is usually an annual or semi-annual performance
review completed by the employee's immediate
supervisor.

Recent research suggests that feedback

source characteristics affect employee performance.
study by Becker and Klimoski (1989) suggested that
supervisory feedback was associated with improved job
performance while feedback from self and peers was
not.

According to Ilgen et al.

(1979) the two major

A
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components of the source affecting feedback acceptance
are the source's power and the source's credibility.
Source Power.

The power of the source, relative

to the ratee, influences feedback acceptance.
et al.

Ilgen

(1979) suggested that the increased source

power will lead to increased feedback acceptance.
Regardless of employees' acceptance of the feedback,
source power affects employees' desire to respond
(Carrol & Schneier, 1982).

Research by Carrol and

Schneier suggested that the greater the power of the
source to reward and/or punish the subordinate, the
greater the desire to respond.

Additionally, research

by Earley (1986) suggested that the importance of the
feedback (i.e., its impact on compensation and/or
promotion) mediates the feedback-performance relation.
He found that employees are more likely to respond to
feedback when the feedback source has.the power for
reward or punishment.
Source Credibility.

According to Ilgen et a l .

(1979), source credibility is the principal source
characteristic affecting acceptance of feedback.
Credibility is determined by the recipient's
perception of the source's expertise, the receipient's

trust in the source's motives, and the reliability of
the source.
trust

Earley (1986) demonstrated that employee

in the feedback source mediated the influence

of feedback on work performance in both the United
States and the United Kingdom.

This research suggests

that source characteristics influence feedback
acceptance.

Specifically, the greater the source's

perceived expertise, trustworthiness, and power, the
greater the ratee's acceptance of feedback.
possible that

It is

perceptions of political use of

performance appraisal could reduce ratee acceptance of
feedback by reducing trust in the source of the
rating.

The present study will investigate the

hypothesis that perceived political use of performance
appraisal will be associated with ratee's reduced
rating acceptance, trust in the rater (source), and
the appraisal process (HI).
Feedback Message.

The feedback message has two

major attributes which affect feedback acceptance:
the sign (positive vs. negative) of the feedback and
the consistency of the message (Ilgen et al., 1979).
Feedback Sign.

In general, positive feedback is

more readily accepted than negative feedback (Landy &

Farr, 1983).

According to Ilgen et al.

(1979),

positive feedback is consistent with most individuals1
self images and is therefore more readily accepted.
Recent research has supported the effects of feedback
sign.

For example, Russell and Goode (1988) found

that managers' satisfaction with their appraisal was
predicted by the sign of the feedback.

Managers in

this study were more satisfied with positive feedback
than with negative feedback.

This body of research

suggests that positive feedback is positively related
to feedback acceptance.
Research suggests that inflated appraisals will be
readily accepted by employees (Ilgen et al., 1979).
Inflated appraisal presumably gives ratees the
perception that their performance is at least
acceptable.

Therefore, ratees will believe that there

is no need for improvement.

Thus, the present

research will investigate the hypothesis that
politically inflated appraisal will not be associated
with desire to respond to the feedback (H2).
Negative feedback tends not to be as readily
accepted as positive feedback (Landy & Farr, 1983).
Recent research has shown negative feedback to lead to

the belief that the rater has an inaccurate impression
of ratee performance (Coleman, Jussim,
1987).

& Abraham,

Acceptance of negative feedback will be even

lower (thus lowered goal setting)
lacking in credibility.

if the source is

Research by Podsakoff and

Farh (1989) suggested that negative feedback led to
increased goal setting only if the source was seen as
credible.

The present study will investigate the

hypothesis that ratings which are perceived to be
deflated for political reasons will not be accepted as
accurate by ratees

(H3).

Additionally, deflated

ratings could potentially have effects on employee
attitudes

(Pearce & Porter, 1986).

The present study

will test the hypothesis that ratings deflated for
political reasons will be associated with reduced
trust in the source, the appraisal process, and the
organization itself (H4).
Feedback Consistency.

Research has shown that

inconsistent feedback is not accepted as readily as
consistent feedback (Stone & Stone, 1985).
al.

Ilgen et

(1979) assume that inconsistent feedback may

confuse the recipient or be attributed to sources
beyond the employee's control and therefore not be
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accepted.

As inconsistent feedback is less accepted,

it is assumed that it could lead to reduced employee
motivation and performance.
As previously discussed, Longenecker (1989)
provides evidence that there may be politically
motivated inconsistency between spoken appraisal and
the appraisal that is written for administrative
purposes.

For example, written appraisals (for

administrative purposes) may be inflated while the
spoken message is more negative.

This could be due to

managers' reluctance to adversely affect employee
compensation and various other motivations (presented
earlier).

Managers may then give more accurate spoken

feedback to employees.
Alternatively, due to other political reasons
(e.g., budgetary constraints) the written appraisal
may be more negative than the spoken appraisal.

For

example, a manager may feel organizational pressures
not to give superior ratings due to the consequences
in terms of merit pay increases.

However, spoken

feedback may indicate the employee did, in fact,
exhibit superior performance.
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The present study will investigate the hypothesis
that politically motivated inconsistent feedback will
be associated with reduced acceptance and reduced
desire to respond to the feedback (H5).

Additionally,

the hypothesis that the perception of politically
biased inconsistency in the rating process is
associated with reduced trust in the appraisal source,
the appraisal process, and the organization itself,
will be tested (H6).
Absence of Feedback.

Research by Ashford (1986)

and Ashford and Cummings (1983) suggests that
performance feedback is a valued resource for
employees.

These authors posit that individuals who

do not receive adequate feedback will attempt to
obtain it from organizational and other sources.
Recent research (Longenecker & Gioia, 1988) suggests
that organizational politics may cause managers not to
receive adequate feedback.
Longenecker and Gioia (1988) provided evidence
that high level executives desire, yet do not receive,
regular performance feedback.

Managers reported that

a lack of appraisal led to a negative attitude toward
their supervisors, increased anxiety and frustration,
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and a poorer job of appraising their own subordinates.
Additionally, McCarty (1986) demonstrated that a lack
of feedback was associated with lowered
self-confidence and expected performance in both men
and women.
The preceding sections address the effects of
appraisal politics on motivation through the
feedback-performance process

(Ilgen et al., 1979).

It

is possible that perceptions of political appraisal
behavior could have additional effects on employees
through employees' feelings of inequity (Adams,
1965).
outcomes

The link between inequity and negative
(e.g., reduced motivation; negative job

attitudes)

is well established in the organizational

sciences literature (for a review, see Greenberg,
1982).

The possible effects of politically biased

appraisals on equity perceptions are presented in the
following section.
Equity and Fairness Perceptions in
Performance Appraisal
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) suggests that
employees compare their ratio of inputs (e.g.,
performance) to outcomes (e.g., appraisal,

compensation) to some internal standard and/or a
comparison other.

The relation between

inequity/unfairness and negative outcomes has been
well established by researchers (Greenberg, 1982).
Although much of the research on equity has been done
in the reward allocation area (e.g., distributive
justice), recent research has shown the importance of
procedural

factors in determining rewards (e.g.,

procedural justice; for a review, see Greenberg,
1986).

Additionally, researchers have investigated

the role of distributive and procedural justice
(fairness)

in the area of performance appraisal

(Dipboye & de Pontbriand, 1981; Greenberg, 1986;
Landy, Barnes-Farrell, & Cleveland, 1980; Landy,
Barnes, & Murphy, 1978).
The importance of perceived fairness (equity) in
performance appraisal has been highlighted by
Greenberg (1986).

He delineated determinants of

perceived performance appraisal fairness.

Respondents

indicated that there were both distributive and
procedural factors that determined fairness and
satisfaction with the appraisal process.

These

procedural factors include rater familiarity with

ratee's work, consistent application of standards,
receipt of rating based on performance achieved, and
recommendations for salary/promotion being based on
the appraisal.

Additionally, a study by Folger and

Konovsky (1989)

found procedural justice factors in

pay raise determination to account for more variance
than distributive justice factors in the dependent
variables trust in supervisor and organizational
commitment.

It is apparent from this research that

fairness is an important determinant of employee
satisfaction with performance appraisal systems.
It is possible that perceptions of political bias
affect motivation through employee perceptions of
unfairness in the appraisal system.

Employees may

feel that they are receiving equal or lesser outcomes
for superior performance if they perceive political
bias in the ratings; therefore, they may feel that the
appraisal system is unfair.

When this is the case,

their subsequent motivation could be reduced.
Further, satisfaction and commitment to the
organization and the appraisal system could also be
reduced.

The present study will investigate the
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relationship between inequity and employee attitudes
and desire to respond to feedback (H7).
Due to past research that demonstrated individuals
have a greater tolerance for positive inequity (e.g.,
outcomes greater than inputs; Lane & Messe', 1972) it
is hypothesized that politically inflated appraisals
will not be associated with greater desire to respond
to feedback (H2).

However, when employees believe

that other employees have received inflated ratings
(while they have received accurate or deflated ones)
inequity perceptions may be experienced.

The present

study will investigate the hypothesis that inequity
perceptions will be associated with reduced desire to
respond to feedback (H7).
Further, in the case where employees perceive that
other employees have received politically inflated
ratings, it is hypothesized that trust in the
appraisal source, organization, and appraisal system
will be reduced (H7a).

Additionally, the hypothesis

that felt inequity will be associated with reduced
trust in appraisal process and in the organization,
will be tested (H8).

Finally, the hypothesis that

inequity perceptions will be associated with lowered
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belief in appraisal system value will be
investigated (H9).
As previously discussed, research by Longenecker
(1989) suggested that verbal feedback from supervisors
may differ from written feedback (e.g., for
administrative purposes).

Written feedback can be

more positive than spoken or vice versa.
Research on inequity in organizations (e.g.,
Greenberg, 1982) suggests that when employees do not
receive rewards due them, motivation will be reduced
and negative job attitudes will increase.

In the

event that verbal feedback differs from written
feedback it is suggested that these negative outcomes
will be manifested.

For example, a case where a

manager tells an employee he/she is doing an
"outstanding" job yet the appraisal reads
"satisfactory" could lead to reduced acceptance and
desire to respond to feedback (H5a) and also to
reduced trust in rater and in the appraisal process
(H6a).

The present research will test

these hypotheses.
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Overview of the Present Study
Despite the vast amount of past research on
performance appraisal, there remain areas in need of
further study.

Prior appraisal research has not

adequately addressed the issues of how performance
appraisal is conducted in organizations or the
motivations of raters in organizations.
to

In response

this, recent research has demonstrated that raters

in organizations have numerous motivations other than
rating accuracy.

Whereas researchers have identified

a number of political motivations that might cause
raters to distort ratings, the effects of these
distortions have not been investigated.
The consequences of distorted ratings warrant
research for several reasons.

Accepted feedback is a

necessary component of the performance
appraisal-performance improvement process.

If

politically motivated distortions reduce feedback
acceptance, employee motivation may be reduced.
Additionally, perceptions of inequity in appraisal
have been demonstrated to have negative consequences.
If politically motivated distortions lead to inequity
perceptions, negative outcomes may result.
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Managers may believe that they are distorting
ratings for valid reasons.

However, the potential

negative results of the distortions may outweigh any
intended benefit of their use.

The present study is

an attempt to determine the consequences of
politically motivated distortions in
performance appraisal.
The present research will use the 1979 Ilgen et
al. feedback model,

along with research evidence from

goal setting and equity theories of motivation,

as

starting points in investigating the effects of
politically motivated rating distortion on ratee
attitudes and desire to respond to feedback.
Toward a Model of Politics in Performance Appraisal
As the literature supporting the hypotheses of the
present study comes from various theories,

it is hoped

that the results of this research will be a first step
in developing a model of the effects of politics in
performance appraisal.
could take the form of:

This model

(See Figure 2)

The general construct of

politics in appraisal leading to perceptions and

Ill III

o
(L
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III

D.

Figure 2. Tentative model of the effects of politics
in performance appraisal.

experiences with politics (e.g., inflation, deflation,
inconsistency, inequity).

Personal experiences with

politics might then lead to psychological processes
such as perceived equity, trust (in organization,
rater, appraisal process), perceived value of the
appraisal system, and acceptance of appraisal
feedback.

Finally, these psychological processes

might lead to desire to respond to appraisal feedback.
The viability of such a model will be further
addressed in the discussion section of this paper.
Hypotheses
The present research consists of two studies, a
vignette manipulation experiment and a field survey.
Previous sections discussed literature on politics in
performance appraisal, performance feedback, and
equity theory.

Hypotheses were developed, based on

these bodies of research, concerning employee
attitudes and desire to respond to feedback.

These

hypotheses are presented in the following sections.
Hypotheses are presented separately due to the fact
that study 1 involves manipulations of politics in
appraisal and study 2 deals with perceptions of
politics in appraisal.

Numbered hypotheses in each

study are essentially identical except for the
aforementioned difference.

Hypothesis 1 could not be

tested in the simulation study.
Study 1 (Simulation)
H2:

Ratings inflated due to political factors
will have no effect on desire to respond to
appraisal feedback.

H3:

Ratings deflated due to political factors
will result in lower rating acceptance.

H4:

Politically motivated deflation of ratings
will result in lower trust in the rater, the
organization, and the appraisal process.

H5:

Politically motivated inconsistency between
written appraisal and verbal feedback during
the appraisal interview will result in lower
desire to respond to appraisal feedback and
rating acceptance.
H5a: Ratees receiving verbal feedback at the
appraisal interview which is more
positive than their written appraisal
will have a lower desire to respond to
appraisal feedback versus ratees whose
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written feedback is more positive than
or equal to their spoken feedback.
H6:

Politically motivated inconsistency between
written appraisal and verbal feedback in the
appraisal interview will result in lower
trust in rater and the appraisal process.
H6a: Ratees receiving verbal feedback at the
appraisal interview which is more
positive than their written appraisal
will have lower trust in the rater and
in the appraisal process.

H7:

Inequity in the appraisal process will result
in lower desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.
H7a: When co-workers receive inflated
ratings, ratees who did not receive
inflated ratings will have lower desire
to respond to appraisal feedback.

H8:

Inequity in performance appraisal will result
in lower trust in rater, the appraisal
process and the organization.
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H9:

Inequity in performance appraisal will result
in lower perceptions of the value of the
appraisal system to the organization.
Study 2 (Field Survey)

Hi:

Perception of politics in the appraisal
process will be negatively associated with
rating acceptance, trust in rater, and
perception of appraisal system value.

H2:

Ratings perceived to be inflated due to
political factors will have no association
with desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

H3:

Ratees' perceptions that their ratings are
deflated due to political factors will be
negatively associated with rating acceptance.

H4:

Perceived politically motivated deflation of
ratings will be negatively associated with
trust in rater, the organization, and the
appraisal process.

H5:

Ratee perception of politically motivated
inconsistency between written appraisal and
verbal feedback during the appraisal
interview will be negatively associated with

desire to respond to appraisal feedback and
rating acceptance.
H6:

Perception of politically motivated
inconsistency between written appraisal and
verbal feedback in the appraisal interview
will be negatively associated with trust in
rater and the appraisal process.

H7:

Ratee perception of inequity in the appraisal
process will be negatively associated with
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

H8:

Ratee perception of inequity in the appraisal
process will be negatively associated with
trust in rater, the appraisal process and
the organization.

H9:

Inequity in performance appraisal will be
negatively associated with perceptions of the
value of the appraisal system to
the organization.

Overview of Methodology
The present research consisted of two studies.
Study 1 manipulated all independent variables through
the use of vignettes.

In study l, subjects completed

questionnnaires after reading vignettes describing
their hypothetical rating and the hypothetical
organizational conditions surrounding it.

This

study assessed the extent to which manipulations of
organizational politics affect ratee attitudes and
ratee desire to respond to feedback in an
experimental design.
Study 2 assessed the extent to which perceptions
of organizational politics in the appraisal process
were associated with ratee desire to respond to
appraisal feedback and with ratee attitudes toward
appraisal.

Subjects completed a survey measuring

their perceptions of their organization's appraisal
system, their attitudes toward it, and their desire to
respond to appraisal feedback.

Hypotheses concerning

the relationships between appraisal politics and ratee
motivation and attitudes were tested.
This two-part methodology was designed to achieve
two purposes.

Study 1 allowed manipulation of
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politics and ratings by simulation whereas otherwise
these variables would have been impossible to
manipulate.

Study 2 was designed to maximize

generalizability by assessing perceptions of politics
and performance appraisal as they existed in an actual
organization.

Therefore external and internal

validity should have been maximized by the two-part
design of the present research.
Study 1
Method
Subjects
The subjects for this research were 47 employees
from a large international consulting firm and 50
employees from a large midwestern insurance company.
Subjects were selected on the basis of 1) having been
recipients of annual or semi-annual formal performance
reviews and 2) that they would continue to receive
performance evaluations.
Surveys were randomly distributed by a contact
person in each organization.

Subjects from the

consulting firm were professional level employees
(e.g., managers, partners, consultants)

located in

offices throughout the southwest United States.
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Subjects from the insurance company were professional
level employees (e.g., managers, district managers,
agents) working in offices throughout one midwestern
state.

Of the 108 distributed in the consulting firm,

47 were completed, yielding a response rate of 43.5%.
Of the 162 distributed in the insurance company, 50
were completed, yielding a response rate of 30.8%.
The overall response rate was 35.9%.
The consulting firm sub-sample contained 36 males
and 11 females.

Of these subjects, 34% were between

the ages of 20 and 29, 38.3% were between the ages of
3 0 and 39, 21.3% were between the ages of 40 and 49,
and 3% were over the age of 50.

Further, 42.6% had

been employed in their job for less than 5 years, 34%
for between 5 and 10 years, and 23.4% over 10 years.
The insurance company sub-sample was made up of 33
males and 17 females.

Of these subjects, 22% were

between the ages of 20 and 29, 28% were between the
ages of 30 and 39, 34% were between the ages of 40 and
49, and 16% were over the age of 50.

Of these

subjects, 32% had been employed at their present job
for less than 5 years, 28% for between 5 and 10 years,
and 40% for over 10 years.

Therefore the entire sample consisted of 69 males
and 28 females.

Furthermore, 27.8% were between the

ages of 20 and 29, 33% were between the ages of 3 0 and
39, 27.8% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and
11.3% were over the age of 50.

Of these subjects,

37.1% had been employed at their present job for less
than 5 years, 30.9% for between 5 and 10 years, and
3 2% for over 10 years.
Procedure
The contact person in each company randomly
distributed packets of materials to employees (one per
subject).

This packet contained a cover letter

(Appendix A) which explained the study to the partici
pants and assured confidentiality.

Also included in

the packet was one of 27 vignettes which are described
in the following section.
one vignette.

Each subject received only

The vignette requested subjects to

assume that they received a certain rating given the
circumstances described in the vignette.
Additionally, subjects completed a questionnaire
assessing reactions to political use of performance
appraisal and desire to respond to appraisal feedback,
given the appraisal and organizational conditions
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described in the vignette.

Subjects mailed the

questionnaire directly to the researcher to insure
confidentiality.
Vignettes
Due to the fact that the present study could not
manipulate politics and ratings in the participating
organizations, the independent variables were
manipulated through vignettes.

The instructions

(Appendix B) told subjects to assume that they
received the rating described in the vignette, given
the organizational conditions described.
vignettes

The

(Appendix C) varied the level of political

bias in the subject's ratings

(inflated, deflated,

accurate)

and ratings of co-workers

deflated,

accurate).

(inflated,

Additionally, the level of

agreement between the subjects' written and spoken
feedback (written > spoken, spoken > written, no
inconsistency) was varied.

Manipulations of political

inflation, deflation, and rating inconsistency were
developed using factors identified by Longenecker et
a l . (1987).

Each vignette described the subject's

written rating,
performance."

spoken feedback, and ''actual
Additionally, ratings of co-workers,
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and possible political motivations of the organization
and supervisor were provided.

For example, subjects

(in one experimental condition) may have been told
that they received a rating of "outstanding" (a "7" on
a seven-point scale), whereas their actual performance
was "above average"

(a "5"), due to their supervisors

wishing to avoid conflict with them.
Using a methodology similar to Greenhaus, Seidel,
and Marinis (1983), variables (inflation/deflation of
subjects' ratings, inflation/deflation of others'
ratings, inconsistency between written and spoken
feedback) were presented in all possible combinations
thus yielding 27 separate vignettes.

The vignettes

were randomly distributed to the subjects.
Study 1 was, therefore, a 3 (subject
rating— inflated, deflated, accurate) X 3 (co-workers'
rating— inflated, deflated, accurate) X 3 (subjects'
written vs. spoken appraisal— spoken > written,
written > spoken, written = spoken) factorial design.
Dependent Variables
Due to a lack of available suitable scales of the
dependent variables of this study, the variables were
measured by a 25-item tailor-made survey instrument
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(Appendix D ) .

All items, except demographics, were

measured by a 5-point Likert-type scale.

Demographic

and manipulation check items brought the total number
of items to 35.
Acceptance of Feedback.

The extent to which

subjects accepted their ratings as accurate indicators
of their performance was measured by four items (e.g.,
"Based on my performance, I was accurately
evaluated").

This scale used some items adapted from

the TAPS scale on ratee perceptions of the appraisal
process by Bernardin et al.

(1981).

Additional items

were adapted for use from scales on ratee attitudes on
performance feedback by Landy et al.
Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981).

(1978) and

Coefficient alpha

was .90.
Trust in the Organization.

Subjects' trust in the

hypothetical organization was measured by a four-item
measure.

Items (e.g., "I trust this organization to

act in my best interest") are similar to those from
various scales of job involvement, organizational
commitment, and organizational climate which appear in
Cook, Hepworth, Wall, and Warr (1981).
alpha was .69.

Coefficient

Trust in the Appraisal Process.

Subjects' trust

in the hypothetical organization's appraisal process
was measured by five items (e.g., "The performance
appraisal process in this organization can be
trusted").

Items were adapted for inclusion from a

measure of fairness by Folger and Konovsky (1989).
Additional items were included which were designed to
be similar to those addressing trust in the appraisal
process from various scales of job involvement,
organizational commitment, and organizational climate
which appear in Cook et al. (1981).

Coefficient alpha

was .89.
Trust in the Rater.

Subjects' trust in the rater

was measured by four items (e.g., "I trust the
supervisor who gave me this rating").

Some items for

this scale were adapted for inclusion from a measure
of fairness by Folger and Konovsky (1989).

Additional

items were included which were written to be congruent
with those tapping rater trust from various sub-scales
of job involvement measures which appear in Cook et
al.

(1981).

Coefficient alpha was .84.

Desire to Respond to Appraisal Feedback.
Subjects' desire to respond to appraisal feedback was
measured using a scale designed to be similar to
various job involvement scales appearing in Cook et
al.

(1981).

Additional items were adapted from a

scale on ratee intentions to improve performance by
Platz (1985).

Subjects' agreement with each of the

four items (e.g.,

"This performance appraisal makes me

feel motivated to perform effectively") was measured
by a Likert-type scale.

Coefficient alpha was .85.

Appraisal System V a l u e .

Subjects' perceptions of

the value of the hypothetical organization's
performance appraisal system were measured by four
items (e.g., "The performance appraisal system in this
organization is a worthwhile use of resources").

Some

items from a measure of employee reactions to
appraisal systems by Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981)
were adapted for inclusion.

Additional items were

written to be similar to those dealing with the value
of performance appraisal from various scales of job
involvement, organizational commitment, and
organizational climate which appear in Cook et al.
(1981).

Coefficient alpha was .71.
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Manipulation check items.

Manipulation check

items were also included in the questionnaire.

These

items assessed the extent to which manipulations of
rating inflation, deflation, and consistency were
successful.

For each item (e.g., My written appraisal

was more negative than verbal feedback from my
supervisor"), subjects indicated their level of
agreement on a five-point Likert-type scale.

These

items appear on the last page of Appendix D.
Demographics.

Subjects* sex, age, years of

employment, and years of employment at their present
job were measured by four items.

These items were

placed at the end of the survey because research by
Roberson and Sundstrom (1990) found that subjects were
more likely to complete and return questionnaires when
demographic items appeared at the end of
the instrument.
Analysis
Study 1 was analyzed by a 3 [subject
rating— inflated (n = 26), deflated (n — 37), accurate
(n = 34)] X 3 [co-workers* rating— inflated (n = 24),
deflated (n = 38), accurate (n = 35)]

X 3 [(subjects'

written vs. spoken appraisal— spoken > written (n =
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31) , written > spoken (n = 35) , written = spoken (n =
31)] factorial ANOVA.
Results
Manipulation Check Results
To test the effectiveness of the vignette
manipulations, 3 X 3 X 3
performed.

factorial ANOVAs were

Results indicated significant main effects

for subject rating on the manipulation check items
assessing inflation (F,(2,71) = 62.03, p < .0001),
deflation (F,(2,71) = 97.77, p < .0001), and accuracy
(F,(2,71) = 89.47, p < .0001) of ratings.
Subsequent Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD)
analyses indicated that subjects receiving inflated
ratings had significantly higher mean agreement (M =
1.85, n = 26) with the item assessing inflation of
rating than subjects receiving accurate (M = 4.08, n =
34) or deflated (M = 4.05, n = 37) ratings.
Additionally, analyses indicated that subjects
receiving deflated ratings had significantly higher
mean agreement (M = 2.14, n = 37) with the item
assessing deflation of rating than subjects receiving
accurate (M = 4.26, n — 34) or inflated (M = 4.00, n =
26) ratings.

Further, subjects receiving accurate
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ratings had significantly higher mean agreement (M =
1.88, n = 34) with the item assessing accuracy of
rating than subjects

receiving inflated (M = 4.08,

26) or deflated (M =

4.19, n = 37) ratings.

n =

Additional ANOVA results indicated significant
main effects for positive inconsistency (written
appraisal higher than verbal appraisal)

(F,(2,71) =

94.68, p < .0001), negative inconsistency (verbal
higher than written)

(F,(2,71) = 124.26,

and no inconsistency (F,(2,71) = 85.40,

< .0001),

e
e

<

.0001)

manipulations of subject ratings on the manipulation
check items designed to assess negative, positive, and
no inconsistency in appraisal, respectively.
As in the previously discussed results, subsequent
HSD tests indicated that subjects had significantly
higher agreement with the manipulation check item
assessing their given condition than subjects in the
remaining conditions.

Therefore,

manipulations of

subject inflation, deflation, accurate, positive
inconsistency, negative inconsistency, and no
inconsistency were judged to be effective.
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Interrelationships among Variables
As previously mentioned, Study 1 manipulated the
variables:

Subject rating, co-worker rating, and

inconsistency between written and spoken appraisal.
The dependent variables:

Acceptance of rating, trust

in the organization, trust in the rater, trust in the
appraisal process, and perceived value of the
appraisal system were measured.

Table 1 presents

descriptive statistics and variable intercorrelations
for the dependent measures.
Analysis of Variance
In order to test the Hypotheses of Study 1,
separate 3 X 3 X 3

factorial ANOVAs were performed.

Results of these analyses are presented in Tables 2
through 7.

As mentioned above, cell sizes were not

equal in Study l.

To deal with this issue, a General

Linear Model (GLM) approach to ANOVA was used.

This

approach, suggested by Kirk (1983), helps to minimize
the effects of unequal cell sizes.

The GLM approach

is preferred because it encompasses all ANOVA and
regression models.

For the purposes of hypothesis
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testing, Type III sums of squares were interpreted so
as to yield a more conservative test of the
hypotheses.

Significant main effects are presented by

independent variable.

Significant interactions are

presented following a summary of main effects.

[Note:

it is acknowledged that several authors (e.g., Kirk,
1982; Ott, Larson & Mendenhall, 1983) would suggest
that main effects are rendered uninterpretable when
interaction effects are present.

However, for clarity

of presentation, main effects and interactions are
presented separately.

It is the present author's

position that the small cell sizes for the
interactions (discussed in later section) make the
interactions virtually uninterpretable.

The issue of

interactions is also addressed in the discussion
section.]
Inflation of ratings.

Hypothesis 2 (the first

hypothesis tested in Study 1) predicted that inflation
of subject ratings would have no effect on subjects'
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

ANOVA

results (see Table 2) indicated a main effect for
subject rating on desire to respond to appraisal
feedback (F(2,71) = 11.84, p < .0001, omega squared =
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X

D

t

.173).

Follow-up Tukey's (HSD) procedures indicated

that subjects who received inflated ratings (M =
14.19, n = 24) did not significantly differ from
subjects receiving deflated ratings (M = 16.05, n =
37) on mean desire to respond to feedback.

However,

subjects who received accurate ratings (M = 11.85, n =
34) indicated significantly greater desire to respond
to feedback than subjects receiving inflated ratings
(M = 14.19).

Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not

supported.
Deflation of ratings.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that

ratings deflated due to political factors would result
in lower rating acceptance.

ANOVA results (see Table

3) indicated a significant main effect (F(2,71) =
54.69, p < .0001, omega squared = .394) for subject
rating on rating acceptance.
Differences between all group means were
significant in this analysis.

Subjects receiving

deflated ratings (M = 17.81, n = 37) had significantly
lower rating acceptance than subjects who received
inflated ratings (M = 14.86, n = 26), whose ratings
were also lower than subjects who received accurate
ratings (M = 9.79, n = 34), supporting Hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 4
deflated ratings

predicted that subjects who received
would have lower trust in the rater,

lower trust in the organization, and lower trust in
the appraisal process.

Analyses indicated main

effects for subject rating on trust in the rater (see
Table 4)

(F(2,71) = 16.85, p < .0001, omega squared =

.209), trust in organization (see Table 5) (F(2,71) =
12.46, p < .0001, omega squared = .153), and trust in
the appraisal process (see Table 6) (F(2,71) = 13.92,
p <

.0001, omega squared = .153).
HSD analyses

indicated that subjects receiving

accurate ratings (M = 12.68, n = 34) and subjects who
received inflated ratings (M = 14.85, n = 26) had
significantly higher mean trust in the rater than
subjects who received deflated ratings (M = 16.97, n =
37).

Further, subjects receiving accurate ratings had

significantly higher mean trust in the organization (M
= 11.82, n = 34) than subjects receiving deflated
ratings (M = 15.84, n = 37) and subjects receiving
inflated ratings (M = 14.23, n = 26).

Finally,

subjects receiving accurate ratings had significantly
higher mean trust in the appraisal process (M = 16.59,
n = 34) than subjects who received deflated ratings (M
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= 21.65, n = 37).

Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was

supported by these results.
Additional ANOVA results (see Table 7) indicated a
significant main effect for subject rating (F(2,71) =
9.55, p < .001, omega squared = .12) on perceived
appraisal system value.

Tukey's (HSD) analyses

indicated that subjects whose ratings were deflated
had lower mean perceived appraisal system value than
subjects receiving accurate ratings (M = 15.54, n = 37
vs. M = 12.62, n = 34).

There were no mean

differences on this variable between subjects who
received inflated ratings and subjects who received
accurate ratings (M = 14.27, n = 26 vs. M = 12.62, n =
34) .
Inconsistency between written and verbal rating.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that politically motivated
inconsistency between written and verbal feedback
would result in lower rating acceptance and desire to
respond to appraisal feedback.

Additionally,

Hypothesis 5a predicted that subjects receiving verbal
feedback which was more positive than their written
appraisal would have lower desire to respond to
appraisal feedback than subjects whose written
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appraisal was equal to or more positive than their
verbal feedback.

ANOVA results indicated no main

effect (see Table 3) for inconsistency between written
and verbal feedback on rating acceptance (F(2,71) =
1.34, n.s.) nor on desire to respond to appraisal
feedback (see Table 2)(F(2,71) = 2.14, n.s.).

These

results failed to support Hypotheses 5 and 5a.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that politically
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken
performance appraisal feedback would result in lower
trust in the rater and lower trust in the appraisal
process.

Additionally, Hypothesis 6a predicted that

these dependent variables would be lower when written
appraisal was less positive than spoken feedback.
Analyses indicated a main effect for inconsistency on
trust in the rater (see Table 4) (F(2,7l) = 3.67, p <
.05) but not for trust in the appraisal process (see
Table 6) (F(2,71) = 2.55, n.s.).
HSD tests indicated that subjects who received
consistent feedback had higher trust in the rater (M =
13.68, n = 31) than subjects who received written
appraisal more positive than spoken feedback (positive
inconsistency)

(M = 15.68, n = 31) and subjects

receiving written appraisal which was more negative
than their spoken feedback (negative inconsistency)
= 15.29, n = 35).

(M

There were no mean differences

between subjects receiving negative and positive
inconsistency on trust in the rater.

Therefore,

Hypothesis 6 was supported only for trust in the rater
but not for trust in the appraisal process.

Negative

inconsistency (written < verbal feedback) affected
subj e c t s 1 trust in the rater only when compared to
subjects who received consistent ratings, thereby
offering partial support for Hypothesis 6a.
Additional ANOVA results indicated a significant
main effect for rating inconsistency (see Table 7)
(F(2,71) = 3.66, p < .05, omega squared = .042) on
perceived appraisal system value.

Results of Tukey's

(HSD) analyses indicated that subjects whose written
rating was lower than their spoken feedback had higher
mean perceived appraisal system value (M = 13.31, n =
31) than subjects who received consistent ratings (M =
15.19, n = 31).

There were no mean differences

between subjects whose written ratings were greater
than their spoken feedback (M = 14.13, n = 31) and

65
subjects who received consistent ratings (M = 15.19, n
= 31) .
Inequity in appraisal.

Hypothesis 7 predicted

that inequity in the appraisal process would result in
lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback.
results

ANOVA

(see Table 2) indicated that there was no main

effect (F (2,71) = .92, n.s.) for inequity in
co-workers' ratings on desire to respond to feedback,
failing to support Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 7a predicted that, when co-workers'
ratings were inflated, subjects receiving accurate
ratings and subjects receiving deflated ratings would
have lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback
than subjects receiving accurate ratings.
results

ANOVA

(see Table 2) indicated no significant

interaction

between subject rating and co-workers'

ratings (F(4,71) = 0.43, n.s.) on desire to respond to
feedback,

failing to support Hypothesis 7a.

Hypothesis 8 predicted that inequity in the
appraisal process would result in lower trust in the
rater, trust in the organization, and trust in the
appraisal process.

Analyses indicated main effects

for co-worker rating on trust in the organization (see
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Table 5)

(F(2,71) = 6.44, p < .0001, omega squared =

.076) and trust in the appraisal process (see Table 6)
(F(2,71) = 7.81, p < .001, omega squared = .083).
There was no main effect for inequity in co-workers'
rating on trust in the rater (see Table 4)

(F(2,71) =

.33, n .s.).
HSD tests indicated that subjects having
co-workers who received accurate ratings had
significantly higher mean trust in the organization

(M

= 12.86, n = 35) than subjects having co-workers who
received inflated ratings (M = 16.08, n = 24).
However, there were no mean differences in trust in
the organization between subjects having co-workers
who received deflated ratings (M = 13.74, n = 38) and
those having co-workers who received accurate ratings
(M = 12.86, n = 35).

Further, subjects who had

co-workers who received accurate ratings had
significantly higher mean trust in the appraisal
process

(M = 17.37, n = 35) than subjects having

co-workers who received inflated ratings (M = 21.38, n
= 24) or deflated ratings (M = 19.45, n = 38).
Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was fully supported for trust
in the appraisal process but was only partially
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supported for trust in the organization. In the case
where co-worker's ratings were inflated, subjects
reported lower trust in the organization.

There was

no support for the effects of inequity on trust in the
rater.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that inequity in ratings
would result in lower perceived value of the appraisal
system.

Analyses indicated that there was a

significant main effect (see

Table 7) (F(2,71) =

7.90, p < .001, omega squared = .099) for co-workers'
ratings on perceived appraisal system value.
HSD analyses indicated that subjects having
co-workers who received accurate ratings had
significantly higher mean perceived appraisal system
value (M = 13.00, n = 35) than subjects having
co-workers who received inflated ratings (M = 16.04, n
= 24).

However, there were no mean differences in

perceived appraisal system value between subjects
having co-workers who received deflated ratings (M =
14.08, n = 38) and those having co-workers who
received accurate ratings (M = 13.00, n = 35).
Therefore Hypothesis 9 was supported for perceived
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appraisal system value only in the case where
co-worker's ratings were inflated.
Organization Effects
The only significant main effect for subjects'
organization was on trust in the appraisal process (F
(1,55) = 4.54, n < -05, omega squared = .017).
Subjects in the consulting firm had significantly
higher mean (M = 18.04, n = 47) trust in the appraisal
process versus subjects in the insurance company (M =
20.24, n = 50).

There were no other main effects for

organization on any of the dependent measures.
Summary
In summary, Hypotheses 3 and 4 were supported by
the data, and Hypotheses 6, 6a, 8, and 9 were
partially supported by the data.

Subjects who

received deflated ratings had lower trust in the
rater, trust in the organization, trust in the
appraisal process, perceived appraisal system value,
and lower acceptance of rating.

Additionally subjects

who received inflated ratings had lower desire to
respond to appraisal feedback than subjects who
received accurate ratings.

Further, subjects having co-workers who received
accurate (equitable) ratings had greater trust in the
rater and greater perceived appraisal system value
than subjects having co-workers who received inflated
(inequitable) ratings.

Finally, subjects receiving

inconsistent feedback (their verbal feedback was more
positive or negative than their written feedback) had
lower trust in the rater and perceived appraisal
system value.

Hypotheses 2, 5, 5a, 7 and 7a were not

supported by the data.

The results failed to support

the hypothesized non-significant relationship between
rating inflation and rating acceptance.

In this case,

inflated ratings resulted in lower rating acceptance.
Further, the hypothesized relationships between rating
inconsistency and rating acceptance and desire to
respond to appraisal feedback were not supported by
the results of Study I.

Finally, the hypothesized

relationship between rating inequity and desire to
respond to appraisal feedback was not supported.
Interaction Effects
In addition to the main effects in Study 1 there
were a number of interactive effects.

Significant

interactions are presented in the following sections.
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Interaction between Inconsistency and Subject Patinas
ANOVA results indicated significant interaction
effects between inconsistency and inflation/deflation
of subject rating on acceptance of rating (see Table
3)

(F(4,71) = 4.68, p < .005, omega squared = .058)

and trust in the rater (see Table 4) (F(4,71) = 3.67,
p < .05, omega squared = .074).

Graphs of the

significant interactions (Figures 3 and 4) were drawn
to aid in their interpretation.

Due to the small cell

sizes (see Table 8), caution should be exercised when
drawing conclusions based on these interactions.
However, the graphs suggest that, in the Study 1
sample, consistent ratings were associated with
greater rating acceptance and trust in the rater than
were inconsistent ratings except for the case where
the ratings were deflated.
Interaction between Rating. Inconsistency, and
Co-Workers Rating
Results of ANOVA analyses (see Tables 2 through 7)
indicated three-way interaction effects between
subject rating, co-worker rating, and inconsistency in
rating for all dependent variables in the present
study.

Due to the small and missing sample cell sizes
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(see Table 9) and the resulting violation of the ANOVA
homogeneity of variance assumption, these interactions
were virtually uninterpretable.

Therefore, no firm

conclusion about the interaction among these
independent variables can be drawn based on the
present sample.
Interaction between Organization x Independent
Variables
ANOVA results indicated a significant interaction
effect between organization and co-workers ratings on
trust in the appraisal process (F (2,55) = 3.27, p <
.05, omega squared = .027).

There were no other

significant interactions between organization and the
independent variables.
A graph of the resulting interaction (see Figure
5) was drawn to aid in its interpretation.

This graph

suggested that subjects in the consulting firm had
slightly less trust in the appraisal process than
subjects in the insurance company when co-workers
ratings were deflated.

This difference, though

significant, was slight (accounting for less than 3%
of the variance in trust in the appraisal process).
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Summary.

There were three significant two-way

interactions and six significant three-way
interactions.

Due to the small cell sample size for

the three-way interactions, these interactions were
not meaningful.

The need for this issue to be

addressed by future research will be addressed in the
discussion

of the results.

One Wav ANOVAS
Because of the severe violation of the homogeneity
of variance assumption for the F tests in this study
and because the hypotheses were concerned primarily
with main effects, one-way ANOVAS were conducted to
verify the conclusions of Study 1.

These analyses

indicated essentially the same conclusions as the
3x3x3 ANOVAS.

There was a significant effect for

subject rating on desire to respond to feedback (F =
11.18,

p < .0001)

(H2); acceptance of rating (F =

37.05,

p < .0001)

(H3); and trust in the rater (F =

10.36,

p < .0001),

trust in the organization (F =

14.80,

e<

.0001),and trust in the appraisal process

(F = 11.66, £ < -0001)

(H4).

As in the initial analyses there was no main
effect for rating inconsistency on desire to respond
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to feedback (F = .36, n.s.) nor on acceptance of
rating (F = 2.63, n.s.)

(H5; H5a).

Inconsistency also

did not affect trust in the rater (F = 12.11, n.s.) or
trust in the appraisal process (F = 1.83, n.s.)

(H6;

H6a) .
Co-workers' ratings significantly affected desire
to respond to feedback (F = 5.33, p < .01)

(H7; H7a).

As with the initial analyses, co-workers' ratings
significantly affected trust in the organization (F =
6.84, p < .01) and trust in the appraisal process (F =
5.33, p < .01) but not trust in the rater (F = .88,
n.s.)

(H8).

Finally, there was a main effect for co

workers' ratings on perceived appraisal system value
(F = 5.87, p < .01).
Study 2
Method
Subjects
The subjects for Study 2 were 95 employees in a
large midwestern insurance company and 45 employees
from a large northeastern financial institution.
Subjects were selected for inclusion on the basis of
1) having been recipients of annual or semi-annual
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formal performance reviews and 2) that they would
continue to receive performance evaluations.
Surveys were randomly distributed to 135
professional level (e.g., managers, district managers,
agents) employees of the insurance company by a
contact person.

Of these, 95 were completed, yielding

a response rate of 70.4%.

The subsample from the

insurance company consisted of 88 males and 7 females.
Furthermore, 3% were between the ages of 20 and 29,
3 3% were between the ages of 30 and 39, 32% were
between the ages of 40 and 49, and 32% were over the
age of 50.

Of these subjects, 18.6% had been employed

in their present job for less than 5 years, 28.9% for
between 5 and 10 years, and 52.6% for over 10 years.
Surveys were distributed to 80 professional level
employees (e.g., vice presidents, loan officers,
branch managers)

in a large northeastern financial

institution by a contact person.

Of these, 45 were

returned yielding a response rate of 56.3%.

The

financial institution subsample consisted of 24 males
and 21 females.

Furthermore, 38% were between the

ages of 20 and 29, 31% were between the ages of 30 and
39, 24% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and less

80
than 1% were over the age of 50.

Of these subjects,

60% had been employed at their present jobs for less
than 5 years, 20% for between 5 and 10 years, and 20%
for over 10 years.
Therefore, the entire sample consisted of 112
males and 28 females.

Furthermore, 14% were between

the ages of 20 and 29, 35% were between the ages of 30
and 39, 31% were between the ages of 40 and 49, and
23% were over the age of 50.

Of these, 31% had been

employed at their present job for less than 5 years,
27% for between 5 and 10 years, and 42% for over 10
years.
Procedure
A contact person in the insurance company randomly
distributed packets of materials to the subjects (one
per subject).

This packet contained a cover letter

(Appendix E) which explained the study to the
participants and assured confidentiality and a list of
possible political uses of performance appraisal
(Appendix F ) .

Also included in the packet was a

questionnaire (Appendix G) assessing perceptions of
politics in performance appraisal in the organization,
attitudes toward performance appraisal, and desire to
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respond to appraisal feedback.

Subjects were

instructed to mail the questionnaire directly to the
researcher to insure confidentiality.
Instruments
Due to the lack of any suitable available existing
measures of variables in this study, all variables
were measured by a 49-item tailor-made survey
instrument (Appendix G ) .

All responses, except for

demographic items, were measured by a 5-point
Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Agree, 5 = Strongly
Disagree).

Descriptions of variables and sample items

appear below.
Inflation of Ratings.

The extent to which ratings

are inflated (ratings higher than true performance)
was assessed by a four-item scale.

Items (e.g., "Due

to organizational politics, performance ratings in my
organization can sometimes be higher than employees
deserve") were developed by the present author, based
on research by Longenecker et al.

(1989).

Additional

items were modified for inclusion from the Trust in
the Appraisal Process Survey (TAPS; Bernardin, 1978).
Coefficient alpha was .82.

Deflation of Ratings.

The extent to which ratings

are deflated (ratings lower than true performance) was
assessed by a four-item scale.

Items (e.g., "Due to

organizational politics, performance ratings in my
organization are sometimes lower than employees
deserve") were developed based on research by
Longenecker et al.
TAPS

(Bernardin,

1981).

(1989) and modified items from the

1978; Bernardin, Orban, & Carlyle,

Coefficient alpha was .87.

Politics in Appraisal System.

Politics in the

appraisal system was measured by a four-item
instrument.

Items (e.g., "Performance appraisal in my

organization is influenced by politics to a great
extent")

for this subscale were designed to be

congruent with results on politics in appraisal by
Longenecker et al.

(1987).

Coefficient alpha was .89.

Equity Perceptions of Ratings.

The extent to

which subjects perceive their ratings to be equitable
compared to their co-workers was measured by four
items

(e.g.,

"My performance is evaluated as fairly as

the performance of my co-workers").

This scale used

some items which were adapted from scales on ratee
attitudes toward performance appraisal by Platz

(1985)
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and by Bernardin et al.

(1981).

Coefficient alpha was

.88 .
Consistency of Feedback.

The extent to which

performance appraisals are consistent with verbal
feedback from supervisors was measured by a four-item
scale.

Items (e.g., "Verbal feedback from my

supervisor corresponds to my written performance
evaluation")

for this scale were developed to be

congruent with research findings by Longenecker (1989)
which indicated that politics in appraisal can
precipitate inconsistency between written and spoken
feedback.

Coefficient alpha was .83.

Acceptance of Feedback.

The extent to which

subjects accept their ratings as accurate indicators
of their performance was measured by five items (e.g.,
"Based on what I contribute to my organization, I am
accurately appraised").

This scale uses some items

adapted from the TAPS scale on ratee perceptions of
the appraisal process by Bernardin et al.

(1981).

Additional items were adapted for use from scales on
ratee attitudes to performance feedback by Landy et

84
al.

(1978) and Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981).

Coefficient alpha was .84.
Trust in the Organization.

Subjects' trust in

their organization was assessed by four items (e.g.,
"I trust my organization to act in my best interest").
Items were written to be similar to those addressing
trust in the organization from various scales of job
involvement, organizational commitment, and
organizational climate which appear in Cook,
Hepworth, Wall, and Warr (1981).

Coefficient alpha

was .88.
Trust in the Appraisal Process.

Subjects' trust

in their organization's appraisal process was measured
by four items (e.g., "The performance appraisal
process in my organization can be trusted").

Items

were adapted for inclusion from a measure of fairness
by Folger and Konovsky (1989).

Additional items

tapping trust in the appraisal process were included
which were similar to those from various items tapping
job involvement, organizational commitment, and
organizational climate which appear in Cook et al.
(1981).

Coefficient alpha was .89.
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Trust in the Rater.

Subjects* trust in their

supervisor was measured by four items (e.g., "I trust
my supervisor").

Some items for this scale were

adapted for inclusion from a measure of fairness by
Folger and Konovsky (1989).

Additional items were

included which were written to be congruent with
those tapping rater trust from various sub-scales of
job involvement measures which appear in Cook et al.
(1981).

Coefficient alpha was .92.

Desire to Respond to Appraisal Feedback.
Subjects' desire to respond to appraisal feedback was
measured using a scale designed in part from items on
various job involvement scales dealing with desire to
respond to feedback and appearing in Cook et al.
(1981).

Additional items were adapted from a scale on

ratee intentions to improve performance by Platz
(1985).

Subjects' agreement with each of the four

items (e.g., "My performance appraisal makes me feel
motivated to perform effectively") was measured by a
five-point Likert-type scale.

Coefficient alpha

was .85.
Value of the Appraisal System.

Subj e c t s '

perceptions of the value of their organization's

performance appraisal system were measured by a four
items (e.g., "The performance appraisal system in my
organization is a worthwhile use of resources").
Some items from a measure of employee reactions to
appraisal systems by Dipboye and de Pontbriand (1981)
were adapted for inclusion.

Additional items were

written to be similar to items addressing performance
appraisal value from various scales dealing with job
involvement, organizational commitment, and
organizational climate which appear in Cook et
al.

(1981).

Coefficient alpha was .81.

Demographics.

Subjects' sex, age, years of

employment, and years of employment at their present
job were measured by four items.

These items were

placed at the end of the survey due to research by
Roberson and Sundstrom (1990) which suggested that
subjects may be more likely to complete and return
questionnaires when demographic items appear at the
end of the instrument.
Analysis
Correlational analysis was utilized in testing the
hypotheses of Study 2 concerning employee attitudes
and desire to respond to feedback.

Results
Subgroup Analyses
Two-group tests of mean differences (2-tailed t)
were conducted to determine if subjects differed in
their responses depending on their organization.
Results of these tests

(see Table 10) indicated that

there were no significant mean differences between
groups on any political variables measured in this
study.

Therefore,

all subjects were analyzed as one

sample for the purposes of hypothesis testing.
As previously discussed, Study 2 measured 11 vari
ables related to perceptions of and reactions to
political use of performance appraisal.

Table 11

presents descriptive statistics and variable
intercorrelations.

The correlation matrix contains

the information necessary to address the hypotheses.
Perception of politics in appraisal.

Hypothesis 1

predicted that perceived use of politics in the
appraisal process would be negatively associated with
perceived appraisal system value.

Analyses indicated

a significant negative relationship between perceived
use of politics in appraisal and perceived appraisal
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system value (r = -.40,

e

< .0001), supporting

Hypothesis l.
Perception of inflation of ratings.

Hypothesis 2

predicted that perceived politically motivated
inflation of ratings would not be associated with
desire to respond to feedback.

Analyses indicated a

significant negative relationship between perceived
inflation of ratings and desire to respond to feedback
(r = -.236,

e

< .05), failing to support Hypothesis 2.

Perception of deflation of ratings.

Hypothesis 3

predicted that perceived politically motivated
deflation of ratings would be negatively associated
with rating acceptance.

Analyses indicated a

significant negative relationship between perceived
deflation and acceptance of rating (r = -.77,

e

<

.0001), supporting Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that perceived politically
motivated deflation of ratings would be negatively
associated with trust in the rater, trust in the
organization, and trust in the appraisal process.
Analyses indicated significant negative relationships
between perceived deflation and:

Trust in the rater
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(r = -.59, e < .0001), trust in the organization (r =
-.44, e < .0001), and trust in appraisal process (r =
-.61, p < .0001), supporting Hypothesis 4.
Perception of inconsistency in ratings.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that perceived politically
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken
appraisal would be negatively associated with rating
acceptance and desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

Analyses indicated significant negative

relationships between perceived inconsistency and both
rating acceptance (r = -.71,

e

< .0001) and desire to

respond to appraisal feedback (r = -.67,

e

< -0001) ,

supporting Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that perceived politically
motivated inconsistency between written and spoken
appraisal would be negatively associated with trust in
the rater and trust in the appraisal process.
Analyses indicated significant negative relationships
between perceived inconsistency and both, trust in the
rater (r = -.62, e < .0001), and trust in the
appraisal process (r = -.62, e < .0001), supporting
Hypothesis 6.
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Perception of inequity in ratings.

Hypothesis 7

predicted that perceived inequity in ratings would be
negatively associated with desire to respond to
appraisal feedback.

Analyses indicated a significant

negative relationship between perceived inequity and
desire to respond to feedback (r = -.56, p < .0001),
supporting Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 8 predicted that perceived inequity in
ratings would be negatively associated with trust in
the rater, trust in the appraisal process, and trust
in the organization.

Analyses indicated significant

negative relationships between perceived inequity and
trust in the rater (r = -.58, p < .0001), trust in the
appraisal process (r = -.71, p < .0001), and trust in
the organization (r = -.54, p < .0001), supporting
Hypothesis 8.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that perceived inequity in
rating would be negatively associated with perceived
appraisal system value.

Analyses indicated a

significant negative relationship between these
variables

(r = -.48, p < .001), thereby supporting

Hypothesis 9.
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Summary
In summary, the analyses provided support for
Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

In general,

perceptions of politics in appraisal and politically
motivated use of appraisals (inflation, deflation,
inequity in rating, inconsistent ratings) were
associated with negative employee attitudes and lower
acceptance of, and desire to respond to, appraisal
feedback.

No support was found for Hypothesis 2.

Subjects' perceptions of rating inflation were
negatively associated with rating acceptance.
Exploratory Analyses
After testing the hypotheses proposed in the
present study, additional relationships among the
variables were investigated.
Political Variables
As shown in Table 11, the variables measuring
perceptions of politics, inflation, deflation,
inequity, and inconsistency in appraisal all were
significantly and positively related to each other.
Significant non-hypothesized correlations between
these variables and employee attitudes and acceptance
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of, and desire to respond to, feedback are presented
in the following sections.
Politics in appraisal.

Perceptions of politics in

appraisal were also significantly negatively
associated with rating acceptance (r = -.54, p <
.0001), trust in the organization (r = -.53, p <
.0001), trust in the rater (r = -.55, p < .0001),
trust in the appraisal process (r = -.67, p < .0001),
and desire to respond to appraisal feedback (r = -.44,
p < .0001).
Inflation of ratings.

Perceptions of inflation of

ratings were also significantly negatively associated
with rating acceptance (r = -.23, p < .05), trust in
the organization (r = -.26, p < .05), trust in the
rater (r = -.21, p < .05), trust in the appraisal
process (r = -.30, p < .0001), and perceived appraisal
system value (r = -.23, p < .0001)
Deflation of ratings.

.

Perceived deflation of

ratings was also significantly negatively associated
with desire to respond to feedback (r = -.59, p <
.0001) and perceived appraisal system value (r = -.45,
p < .0001).
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Inequity in ratings.

Inequity perceptions were

also significantly negatively associated with rating
acceptance (r = -.65, p < .0001).
Inconsistency in ratings.

Perceptions of

inconsistency were also significantly negatively
associated with trust in the organization (r = -.43, p
< .0001) and perceived appraisal system value (r =
-.57, p < .0001).
Additional Analyses
Regression procedures were used to investigate the
relationships between the variables identified in the
tentative model of politics in performance appraisal
(see Figure 2).

Based on this model, the variables

inflation, deflation and inconsistency of ratings were
combined to yield a measure of personal experience
with politics.

A measure of psychological processes

was developed by combining the variables perceived
equity, acceptance of rating, and trust (in the rater,
the organization, and the appraisal process).

While

the high intercorrelations between variables allowed
for these combinations (see Table 11), it is
acknowledged that this is but one of several
combinations that could be justified empirically.
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Results of analyses using the aforementioned combined
variables indicated that perception of politics in
appraisal significantly predicted perceived value of
appraisal system (B = .42, r2 = .154, t = -5.11, p <
.0001) and desire to respond to appraisal feedback (B
= -.44, rf = .189, t = -5.75, p < .0001).

Figure 6

presents the model of politics in performance
appraisal with regression coefficients added.
However, perception of politics was a stronger
predictor of psychological process variables
Figure 6).

(see

Perception of politics significantly

predicted psychological process variables

(b =

-.713, r2 = .505, t = -11.92, p < .0001).
Additionally, psychological process variables
significantly predicted perceived appraisal system
value (b = .67,

= .443, t = 10.57, p < .0001).

Perception of politics predicted 47% of the
variance in personal experience with politics (B =
.69, r£ = .466, t = 10.32, p < .0001).

Personal

experience with politics and general perception of
politics together predicted 61% of the variance in
psychological process variables (R^ = .609, p <

.0 0 0 1 ).
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Figure 6

Tentative model of the effects of politics in
performance appraisal with regression coeffi
cients added.
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Perception of politics, personal experience with
politics, and psychological processes predicted 49% of
the variance in perceived appraisal value (Rf = .492,
P

< .0001).

However, psychological processes was the

only significant predictor when entered first in the
equation

(B = .744, t = 7.13, p < .0001).

These

variables predicted 54% of the variance in desire to
respond to appraisal feedback (R^ = .535, p < .0001).
Stepwise regression analyses indicated that combined
psychological processes was the strongest predictor (B
= .63, t = 6.32, p < .0001), however, personal
experience with politics also was a significant
predictor (B = -.29, t = -3.07, p < .05).

Perception

of politics was not a significant predictor in this
equation.
While the purpose of this study was not model
testing, the tentative model

(Figure 6), with

regression coefficients added, helps to illustrate the
findings of this study.

It can be seen that

psychological processes strongly predict both
perceived appraisal system value and desire to respond
to appraisal feedback.

Psychological processes are,
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in turn, strongly predicted by general perceptions of
politics and personal experience with politics.
However, the analyses do not allow directional or
causal inferences to be made from these results.
Summary
In summary, hypothesized and non-hypothesized
results indicated several major themes.

First,

variables measuring perceptions of politics in
appraisal were all positively associcated with each
other.

Second, variables measuring employee attitudes

and acceptance/desire to respond to feedback
(hypothesized "reactions” to politics) were all
positively associated with each other.

Further, all

of the political variables were negatively associated
with each attitude and acceptance/desire to respond
variable.

Finally, regression analyses indicated that

combined psychological processes was the strongest
predictor of perceived appraisal system value and
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

Discussion
This section will discuss results of the present
research.

An overview of the findings regarding the

hypothesized relationships between politics in
performance appraisal and ratee attitudes, acceptance
of rating, and desire to respond to appraisal feedback
will first be presented.

A discussion of additional

exploratory analyses will follow.

Next, limitations

of the present research and theoretical and applied
implications will be discussed.

Finally, some

directions for future research in the area will
be presented.
Results of Analyses of Hypothesized Relationships
Hypothesis 1, which predicted that politics in the
appraisal process would be positively associated with
perceived value of the appraisal system, was supported
by the results of Study 2.

This result is consistent

with research on source credibility (Ilgen et al.,
1979; Earley,

1986) which suggests that source

credibility is an important determinant of ratee
reactions to performance feedback.
Results of analyses in both Study 1 and Study 2
failed to support Hypothesis 2 which proposed that
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there would be no relationship between inflation of
ratings and ratee desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

This was hypothesized due to prior research

which suggested that positive feedback would be
readily accepted (Ilgen et al., 1979) and studies
which

suggested that ratees have a high tolerance for

positive inequity (Greenberg, 1983).

Together, these

bodies of research led to the inference that inflated
ratings would suggest that there is no need for
improved performance.

Analyses in both studies

indicated that there was a significant negative
relationship between rating inflation and desire to
respond to feedback.
(1987)

Research by Longenecker et al.

suggested that raters may inflate ratings to

influence ratee behavior (e.g., motivate ratees) and
attitudes.

The results of the present research, while

not supporting Hypothesis 2, suggest that raters'
inflation of performance appraisals may not have the
intended positive effects on ratees.

Further, the

effect of inflation may be actually to de-motivate
ratees.

It is possible that subjects in feedback and

equity research did not know that they were receiving
positive/inequitable feedback.

Subjects in the
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present research were asked explicitly if they
received inflated ratings.

This issue is discussed

further as a limitation of the present research.
Analyses from both Study 1 and Study 2 supported
Hypothesis 3 which predicted that ratings deflated for
political reasons would be negatively associated with
rating acceptance.

These results are consistent with

research on feedback sign (Landy & Farr, 1983) and
suggest that negative feedback is less accepted than
positive feedback.

Additionally, these results are

consistent with equity theory tenets (Carrell &
Dittrich,

1978) that posit that individuals have very

low tolerance of negative inequity (inputs greater
than outcomes).
Hypothesis 4 proposed that politically motivated
deflation of ratings would be negatively associated
with trust in the rater, trust in the organization,
and trust in the appraisal process.

This hypothesis

was supported by both Study 1 (vignettes) and Study 2
(survey).

These results are generally consistent with

research on feedback message (Ilgen et al., 1979) and
suggest that deflated ratings are associated with
negative employee reactions to feedback.

Further,

it
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is consistent with research by Pearce and Porter
(1986) which suggested that negative feedback is
associated with negative employee attitudes.
Hypothesis 5 proposed that politically motivated
inconsistency between written and spoken performance
appraisal would be negatively associated with rating
acceptance and ratee desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

Results of Study 1 indicated that

inconsistency was negatively associated with
rating acceptance but not with desire to respond to
appraisal feedback.

Analyses in Study 2 supported

Hypothesis 5 for both acceptance of rating and desire
to respond to appraisal feedback.

The relationship

between inconsistency in verbal versus written
appraisal is consistent with prior research (Stone &
Stone, 1985), and suggests that feedback consistency
is

an important component of feedback acceptance.

Significant results in Study 2 for desire to respond
to feedback give some support to the contentions of
Longenecker and Gioia (1988) that inconsistency
between written and spoken feedback is associated with
negative outcomes.
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Hypothesis 5a attempted to test the specific form
of inconsistency between written and verbal
performance appraisal.

It was hypothesized that

ratees whose verbal feedback was more positive than
their written appraisal would have lower desire to
respond to appraisal feedback versus ratees whose
written feedback was more positive than their verbal
feedback.

There was no support for this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that inconsistency in
appraisal feedback would be negatively associated with
trust in the rater and trust in the appraisal process.
This hypothesis was not supported by results from
Study 1.

However, results from Study 2 supported

this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6a (tested only in Study 1), predicted
that subjects receiving verbal feedback which was more
positive than their written feedback would have lower
trust in the rater and lower trust in the appraisal
process.

There was no support for this hypothesis.

Taken together, the results of tests of hypotheses
5 and 6 give some support to anecdotal evidence
reported by Longenecker and Gioia (1988) that
inconsistency between verbal and written appraisal
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feedback is associated with negative ratee attitudes
and outcomes.
Hypothesis 7 predicted that inequity in appraisals
would be negatively associated with ratee desire to
respond to appraisal feedback.

This hypothesis was

supported by the results of Study 2.

Ratees who

perceived that inequity existed in the appraisal
process had lower desire to respond to appraisal
feedback.

The results of Study 2 analyses were

consistent with equity theory predictions (Adams,
1965) that felt inequity may lead to
reduced motivation.
Hypothesis 7a attempted to test a specific form of
inequity in appraisal.

It was hypothesized that

ratees who received accurate or deflated ratings would
have lower desire to respond to appraisal feedback
when their co-workers received inflated ratings.
There was no support for this hypothesis, which was
tested only in Study 1.
Hypothesis 8, which predicted that inequity in
performance appraisal would be negatively associated
with trust in the rater, trust in the appraisal
process, and trust in the organization, was partially
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supported by the results from Study 1.

Inequity was

negatively associated with trust in the appraisal
process; however, there was no effect of inequity on
trust in the rater.

Further, trust in the

organization was lower only when subjects' co-workers
received inflated ratings.

Hypothesis 8 was fully

supported for trust in the rater, organization, and
appraisal process by the results from Study 2.
Hypothesis 9 predicted that inequity in
performance appraisal would be negatively associated
with perceived value of the appraisal system.

This

hypothesis was partially supported by the results of
Study 1.

Perceived value of the appraisal system was

greater in subjects whose co-workers received inflated
or deflated ratings (versus subjects whose co-workers
received accurate ratings).

Additional analyses from

Study 2 also found a non-hypothesized negative
relationship between perceived inequity and perceived
value of the appraisal system.

The significant

results from Study 1 and Study 2 are consistent with
equity theory (e.g, Adams, 1965; Greenberg,
& Messe',

1982; Lane

1972) and suggest that felt inequity is

associated with negative attitudes in ratees.

107
Exploratory Analyses
Study 1 .

Additional analyses from Study 1

indicated that acceptance of rating and trust in the
rater were significantly affected by the interaction
between subject ratings and inconsistency in ratings.
As mentioned previously, the small cell sizes (see
Table 8) made the nature of the interactions difficult
to interpret.

However, the graphs of these

interactions suggest that consistent ratings are not
associated with rating acceptance and trust in the
rater when ratings are deflated.
Study 2 .

Additional correlational analyses

indicated three major results (see Table 11).

First,

political appraisal variables were all significantly
positively correlated with each other.

Second, all

reaction variables (trust, acceptance, desire to
respond) were all significantly positively correlated
with each other.

Finally, all political appraisal

variables were significantly negatively correlated
with each reaction variable in this study.
These results suggest that there is a strong
association between different aspects of politics in
appraisal and employee reaction variables.

The
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results of the exploratory analyses give further
support to the thesis that political use of appraisal
is associated with negative outcomes.
Integrative Overview Study 1/Study 2
Results of analyses of Study 1 and Study 2
followed essentially the same pattern.

Perceived

political use of performance appraisals was strongly
associated with negative outcomes in both studies.
Correlational analyses in Study 2 were consistent with
ANOVA results in Study 1.

This suggests that

political perception variables may lead to ratee
outcomes rather than vice-versa (see Figure 5).

While

the results of correlational and regression analyses
(Study 2) do not allow for causal or directional
statements to be made, the research design of Study 1
suggests a possible causal link.
In the two cases where results of Studies 1 and 2
were not consistent (H5, H7), the hypotheses were
supported by the field survey and not the political
manipulation vignette study.

In these cases, however,

mean differences in the Study 1 sample were in the
predicted directions.

While this cannot be

interpreted as any kind of support for the unsupported
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hypotheses, it does suggest that the opposite
relationships did not exist in this sample.
A fifth limitation was the overrepresentation of
males in the study and the elimination of lower level
employees.

The generalizability of the study is

therefore limited to males in higher level jobs.

The

implications of this for future research are addressed
in the final section of the discussion.
Finally, the lack of association between
organization studied (with the exception of one
variable in Study 1) and outcome measures, suggests,
at least in the present samples, subjects'
organization does not moderate perceptions of and
reaction to political variables.

This result is

consistent with the thesis that reaction to politics
is an individual rather than an
organizational variable.
Limitations/Alternative Explanations of Results
Several limitations of the present research should
be noted.

First, the present study used only

self-report questionnaires to measure all dependent
variables.

Previous research has shown that using a

single type of measurement strategy may bias observed
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results (Williams, Cote, & Buckley, 1989).

It is

possible that the nature of the instruments or wording
of the items could have biased the results.

Related

to this, the vignette manipulation and self-report
measures of inflation/deflation of ratings may have
over-stated the phenomenon (e.g., ratees in
organizations may not know when they have received
inflated/deflated ratings) .
The second limitation involves the vignette
manipulations in Study 1.

Although actual ratees in

two organizations were used for this study, the
results were based on reactions to hypothetical
ratings and situations.

As performance appraisal is a

significant event for ratees, it may be the case that
ratees would have reacted differently if they had
actually received the ratings in the organizational
conditions described.

However, this limitation is

probably minor due to the observed consistency
between studies.
A third limitation involves the tailor-made
instruments used to measure the variables.

Although

all measures demonstrated acceptable reliability,
there was a high degree of intercorrelation among

Ill
variables.

It is possible that the variables were

contaminated and do not have a high degree of
discriminant validity.
A fourth limitation concerns the analysis of the
Study 2 results.

Although the research design of

Study 1 allows the suggestion of causal relationships,
the only study to assess existing organizational
politics, Study 2, was analyzed by correlational
techniques.

Correlational analysis only demonstrates

degree of association between variables and does not
allow for causal or directional statements to be made
regarding the obtained relationships.

However, the

overlap and consistency between Studies 1 and 2 serves
to limit the impact of this limitation to a
certain extent.
A final limitation concerns the small, uneven cell
sizes for testing interactions in Study 1.

Although

significant three-way interactions resulted, the small
cell sizes renders these results interpretable.

As

the present study hypothesize only main effects,
future research should be conducted with even cell
sizes of sufficient size for finding and interpreting
interactions among political appraisal variables.
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Applications
The results of the present study have implications
for both theory and application in performance
appraisal.

Longenecker et al.

(1987) demonstrated

that raters may, rather than striving for accuracy,
use performance appraisal as a political tool to
influence outcomes and ratee behavior.
study was an

The present

attempt to discover the effects of these

political biases in performance appraisal on ratee
attitudes, acceptance of feedback, and desire to
respond to feedback.

Results of the present research

suggest that political use of appraisal (e.g.,
inflation, deflation,

inconsistency, inequity)

is

associated with several negative outcomes including
lower trust, lower feedback acceptance, lower belief
in value of appraisal process, and lower desire to
respond to appraisal feedback.
With regard to applied significance, the present
study identified several negative outcomes that were
associated with political bias in appraisal.

Raters

who bias ratings, using the performance appraisal as a
political tool, should realize that political use of
appraisal and political bias in appraisal may lead to
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lower trust in them as raters and lower trust in the
organization and the appraisal process.

The present

research suggests that raters should use the appraisal
process as a means to communicate perceived employee
performance in an unbiased manner.

Raters should

attempt to avoid the perception of inequitable or
biased ratings in order to minimize employee distrust
and negative attitudes toward the appraisal process.
Inconsistency between written and spoken feedback
was associated with negative attitudes and reduced
desire to respond to appraisal feedback.

Raters need

to realize that inconsistency, and political use of
appraisals in general, may be detrimental to
organizational functioning.

Written and verbal

ratings should be as consistent with each other as
possible.

All attempts should be made to avoid

allowing political conditions (e.g., scarcity of
funds, personal agendas) to artificially inflate or
deflate written or verbal feedback.
The present study suggests the need for the
development of rater training programs which
incorporate the effects of political bias in appraisal
and teach methods of reducing/managing politics in
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appraisal

(see Longenecker & Gioia, 1988).

The

present study suggests that these programs should
include a summary of the negative impact of distorted
or biased ratings.

Additionally, potential biases in

ratings and methods for dealing with these should be
covered.

While rater training programs cannot assure

unbiased ratings or employee acceptance of ratings,
they can illustrate the importance of limiting
political use of appraisal.
cannot be totally eliminated.

Politics most likely
However,

its

detrimental impact can be minimized through these
types of programs.
The theoretical significance of this research is
two-fold.

First, the present research extended the

body of research on rater motivation

(Zedeck & Cascio,

1891) and politics in appraisal (Longenecker et al.,
1987) by studying the effects of political bias on
ratees.

Secondly, the present research used both

feedback process research (Ilgen et al.,
equity theory findings (Greenberg,

1979) and

1983) to develop

hypotheses regarding the effects of political bias.
This previous research, along with results of the
present study, can be used as a first step in
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developing a model of the effects of politics in
performance appraisal.

Regression analyses (see

Figure 5) suggest that this tentative model is a
possible representation of how politics operates in
performance appraisal.

It should be noted, however,

that, due to high variable intercorrelations and the
limitations of correlational techniques, other
representations of the results may be better models of
politics in appraisal.
Finally, this research, along with research by
Longenecker et al.

(1987), is a step toward narrowing

the research-practice gap identified by Banks and
Murphy (1985) and putting to rest the implicit
assumption that accuracy is the primary goal of raters
completing performance appraisal documents
in organizations.
Future Research
While the present study provides some support for
the negative effects of political bias in appraisal,
several aspects of the area remain in need of further
study.

First, the effects of political bias need to

be replicated and extended in other samples.

Related

to this, research identifying the pervasiveness of
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politics and the degree of politics in organizations
would be beneficial in understanding the phenomenon
and developing programs and interventions to control
and manage politics.

This research would have

significant implications for performance
appraisal practitioners.
Secondly, testing of a model which incorporates
politics and the use of performance appraisal as a
tool could be undertaken (see Figure 5).

The

collection of data over time and the use of techniques
(e.g., LISREL) which would allow causal inferences to
be drawn would further research in this area.
Additionally, the relationship of politics to
variables not tested (e.g., motivation, performance,
organization commitment, turnover) should be included
in future models.
Third, future researchers should refine and
develop measures of politics and measures of the
effects of politics in performance appraisal.

The

high intercorrelations among variables in the present
study suggest that better measures may need to be
developed and/or variables need to
be reconceptualized.
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Fourth, future research should further investigate
possible interactive effects of political variables in
appraisal.

The present study was not able to

adequately interpret interactions due to small
cell sizes.
Fifth, the present research did not address the
issue of politically motivated lack of appraisal.
This has been suggested as a major area of concern,
especially for executives (Longenecker & Gioia,

1988).

Future research should address this potentially
important issue.
Finally, results of the effects of politically
motivated inconsistency were mixed in the present
study.

Future research should investigate how

inconsistency between written and verbal feedback
impacts ratees.
Conclusion
In conclusion, past research has shown that raters
use performance appraisals as political tools in
attempts to achieve personal and organizational goals
(Longenecker et al., 1987).

The present research

suggests that politically motivated distortions of
ratings impact ratees in several negative w a y s .

Politics in appraisal is related to lower trust,
acceptance of feedback, belief in appraisal system
value and desire to respond to appraisal feedback.
Further, the results suggest that any intended
benefits of political use of appraisal may be
outweighed by the negative impact on ratees.
Therefore, findings from the present study suggest
that raters need to be aware of the effects of
political use of appraisal and strive to give honest,
accurate feedback.

Research in the area of rater

training programs which acknowledge politics in
appraisal will help in this regard, and further reduce
the research-practice gap in performance appraisal.
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Study 1

Dear Participant,
I am conducting research relevant to the Ph.D. degree in
Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Louisiana State University.
I
am conducting this research to learn more about how certain
organisational conditions surrounding performance appraisal would
affect your opinions concerning its use. Due to the fact that I
cannot create the actual conditions 1 wish to research in on
organizational setting, I need your help, t have written a
description of a hypothetical performance appraisal and the
organizational conditions surrounding it. I would like for you to
assume that you received this appraisal given the described
conditions.
Please read the description carefully, and respond to
the attached questionnaire os you would if you had actually received
the rating in the situation described.
After completing the survey, please place the entire packet in
the stamped pre-addressed envelope provided. Your participation in
this study is completely voluntary.
Your responses to all guestlons are completely confidential.
None of the completed questionnaires will be seen by anyone except the
researchers here at Louisiana State University. Please do_not sign
your name to your questionnaire. Sign only the consent form at the
bottom. Additionally, the results of this study will be reported so
that no individual person can be identified.
Your interest and cooperation ore greatly appreciated. Your
responses will contribute significantly to the success of this
research.
If you have any questions about tills research entitled
"Performance Appraisal Questionnaire", feel free to contact me through
the Department of Psychology, Louslann State University, Baton Rouge,
LA 70803 or phone (501) 388-0745 (o) or (504) 767-7651 (h). Thank
you once again I
Sincerely,

(JtjLkA C

/-

Ifred C. Schnur, Jr., M.A.
Louisiana State University requires that all subjects are told that
their participation is voluntary, and that they sign a consent form.
PLEASE READ AMD SIGH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT*
I have read the above statements regarding my participation in this
research study and understand them. I hereby agree to participate in
this study.
SIGNED*

DATE*

Appendix B
Instructions for Vignette Manipulation
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PEnrORHAIfCB REVIEW EXERCISE

rlosse assume that you are employed by an organization In the
same position that you currently hold.
Please alao assume that In
this orgsnl ration you fccelvp an annual written par formance review
which Is sent to the Personnel Department.
this review Is used by
the Tersonnel Department to determine yout salary Increase/decrease
lot the upcoming year.
The wtltten performance review is the major
variable used In determining employee compensation.
The
performance
review
la
conducted
by
your
Immediate
supervisor during your annual performance review meeting.
During
this meeting, your supervisor presents your written performance
review (which will he sent to the personnel department) and gives
you verbal feedback regarding your performance.
The performance
review has several rating categories, however the one which Is most
Important duo to Its Impact on salary Is the OVERAl.t, PERFORHABCB
RATIHO, which Is rated on the following scales

1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

3
Above
Average

3
Oood

7
Outstanding

On the following page la a description of "your" performance
review.
Along with thle description Is a brief dlscuealon of the
conditions In the organization that may have had an effect on your
performance rating.
Please assume that you received this rating
given the organizational environment described.
In addition, your
objective performance
level
(e.g.,
your
"true performance")
la
indicated.
Following this description, you will be ashed to give your
reactions to the review and answer severs) other questions.
Please
remember that your responses will be confidential and seen by no one
other than the researchers here at hSU.
Thank you again for your
time and cooperation.

Appendix C
Vignettes Describing Organizational Conditions
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01:

In flated ,

otlietn d e f la t e d ,

p o s itiv e d iscrepancy

As previously mentioned, in “your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review wlilcli Is completed hy your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to t.lie Personnel Department.
M t l m n g h the evaluation form that Is used hy "your” or gnn Irnt Ion has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers,
and the organization alike!
the nvESAl.t,
t'EBFOnMABCR nATIRO.
Overall performance Is rated on n 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

1
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Oood

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the nmount of pay Increase
that yon will receive and In determining promotion.
Thin Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor. tinting this meeting,
your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
dcpnttment,
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance wan "Outstanding" (7).
Yoursupervisor
also verbally
Indicated that your overall performance wan "Above Average" (5).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realise that your organisation
Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that yon
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written
performance review. In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and
get a maximum merit Increase for you.
Additionally, yon are aware
that other employees In your department
were rated lower than
their actual performance, so that they would receive minimum merit
Increases.

‘BummatT
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated!

"Outstanding" (7);
"Above Averngo" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was!
Your Co-Horkers*
Performance was rated!

"Above Average" (5)I

l.owor than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mind t h e r a t i n g yo u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
su rro u n d in g , p l e a s e c o m p lete th e q u e s t io n n a ir e w hich b e g in s on th e
f o 1lowlng p a g e.

#2!

Inflated ,

others d eflated ,

n eg a tiv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In "your* organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed l>y your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Pepartmnnt.
Although the evaluation form that Is used hy "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workern, and the organlrat Ion alike:
the OVEHW.Ii
PERFORHAnOR r a t I(Id.
Overall porfotmnncn Is rated on a 7 roint
scale ranging from ’’Unacceptable’’ (I) to “Outstanding” (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
d
fielow
Average
Average

5
6
Above
Good
Average

7
Outstanding

This rntlng Is uand to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
Thin In of
major Importance to you, duo to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Jnat como from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
(luring this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance wan
“Above Average"
f*?), however,
your
supervisor
verbally Indicated that your overall performance was “Outstanding”
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Below Average" (3).
Von realise that, your organisation Is highly politlcnl and
people tend to protect tliel r own Interests.
You suspect that you
received “Above Avernqo" (5) on yntir written performance review,
In part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you
and get a mart 1mum merit Increase tor you.
Additionally, you ate
aware that other employees in your department were rated lower
than their actual performance, so that they would receive minimum
merit Increases.

SJUDMUUE
Your Written
Performance Review indicatedr
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated!

"Above Avetngo" (I!)}
"Outstanding" f7) y

Objectively, Your Performance west
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rsted!

"Below Average" (3)»

bower than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mind t h e r a t i n g you r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ich b e g i n s on th e
follow ing page.

43;

Inflated,

others d eflated ,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As rrevlonsly mentioned. In ’•your" organ!ration you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used hy "your" orgnnlrptlon hn9
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organtr.atlon alike!
t.lie ovERAl.f,
rEnFORMARCE RAT1RG.
Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Toor

3
llelow
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rntlng Is used t.n determine the amount of pay Increase
that
you will receive and In
determining promotion.
Thin Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with
your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
Ibis review, which wns sent
to
the .personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
Your supervisor also verbally
indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding"
(7).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
Yon realise that your organisation Is highly pollttcnl end
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect tlist you
tecelved "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance
review, In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and
got a maximum merit Increase for you.
Additionally, you are nware
that
other employees in your deportment were rnted lower thon
their actual performance, so that they would receive minimum merit
Increases.
B.U0SUUZ
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated;
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated;

"Outstanding" (7);
"Outstanding" <7);

Objectively, Your Performance was;
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated';

"Abovo Averngo" (5)j

I.ownr than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi nd t h e r n t l n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t l o n n s l r e w h ic h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

I4t

Inflated,

others

Inflated,

p o s it iv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned, in "your" organization you annually
receive » written performance review which 1» completed hy your
Immediate supervisor mid forwarded to tlio Personnel Department.
Alttiougli the evaluation form thnt is used hy "your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance lo
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike!
the o v e b a m ,
rERFOBMAnCE nATinG,
Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from ’Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

1
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rntlng la used to dotermlnc the amount of pay increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
Tills Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
Ton have just come from your annunl performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel.
department.
Indicated
thnt
your
overoll
performance
was
"Outstanding"
(7),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Average" (5).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average”
(5).
You realise that your organisation In highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
Yon suspect that you
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review. In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and
get a maximum merit incrense for you.
Additionally, yon ate aware
that other employees In your department were rated higher than
their actual performance, due to their supervisors wishing to avoid
conflict with them and so that they would receive maximum merit
increases.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Outstanding" (7);
"Above Average" (5)f

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

“Above Average" (5) t

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mind t h e r a t i n g yo u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e g u e s t l o n n a l r e w h ich b e g i n s on th e
follow ing page.

*5!

Inflated,

others

in flated ,

n eg a tiv e discrepancy

An previously mentioned, in “your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review wlilcli in completed hy your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Fcrsonnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that In used by “your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Irt of mont Importance to
you, your co-workcra, and the organisation alike;
the OVEnAM.
PERFOnHAnCR RATWG.
Overall performance In rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rntlng In used to determine the amount of psy Incrense
that you will receive atul In determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional ratlnq
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary incrense.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor. During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which wan sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance wan
“Above Average"
(5), however,
your supervisor
verbally Indlcnted that your overall performance wns "Outstanding"
<7). Objectively, your performance wan "Helow Average" (3).
you realise thnt your organisation In highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Average” (5) on your written performance review.
In port, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you
and get a maximum merit Increase for you.
Addltionnl ly, you are
aware thnt other employees In your department were rated higher
than their actual performance, so thnt they would receive maximum
merit increases.
‘Bumntsrr
Yout Written
Performance Review Indlcnted;
Verbal Feedback
ftom your Supervisor indicated;

"Above Average" (5)j
"Outstanding* <7)>

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rnted:

"Relow Average" (3);

Higher than tholr actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi nd t h e r n t l n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c l r c u m s t n n c e s
su r r o u n d in g , p l e a s e c o m p l e te t h e q u e n t i o n n n ! r e which b e g i n s on the
fo llo w in g page.

Id

In flated ,

others

Inflated,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned, In "your” organ!ration you annually
receive a written performance review which to completed hy your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Pepnrtment.
Although the evaluation form that la used hy "your'' organization lias
several points of evaluation, one rating la of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike!
the OVERAI.I,
FERFORMABCE RATtSO.
Overall performance la rnted on a 7 point
acale ranging from "Unacceptable" (I) to “Outntnndlng" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rntlng Is lined to determine the amount of ray Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
This Is of
major Importance to you, dun to the fact that each additional rntlng
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Incrense.
Vou have just come from your annunl performance review meeting
with your supervisor,
Burlng this meeting, your supervisor showed
yon your written performance review.
This review, which wns sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
Your supervisor also verbally
Indicated thnt your overall performance was "Outstandlhg"
(7).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realize thnt your organization Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Outstanding" ( 1 ) on your written performance review. In
port, because your supervisor wished to nvold conflict with you and
get a maximum merit Increase for you.
Additionally, you are aware
that other employees In your department were rnted higher than
their actual performance, so that they would receive maximum merit
increases.
Bunsnwuf
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indlcnted!

"Outstanding" (7);
"Outstanding" <7|j

Objectively, Your Performance was!
tour Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Above Avorngo" (5jj

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mind t h e r n t l n g yo n r o c e l v p d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.
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f 7:

Inf lu ted ,

others sccurato,

p o s i t iv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned, In "your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your
Immediate supervisor and fotwardnd to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form thnt In used hy "your" organisation tins
several points of evaluation, one rntlng 1n of most Importance to
you, your co-workern, nnd the organisation alike:
the o v e r a i .i,
rEBFORHAUCE BATIno.
Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point
scole ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Oood

7
Outstanding

Tills rating In used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rntlng
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual petformsnce review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which wns sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
thnt
your
overall
performance
wns
"Outstanding"
(7),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally
Indlcnted
that
your
ovetnil
performance wns
"Above
Average" (5).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average
<5>.
You realise thnt ymtr organisation Is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review. In
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and
get s maximum merit Increase for you.
Additionally, you are swnre
that other employees In your deportment were given ratings equal
to their actual performance.
' Eunmftxr
Sour Written
Performance Review Indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Outntnndlng" (7)f
“Above Avornge" (5)»

Objectively, Your Performance wss:
Your Co-Workers’
Performance was rated:

"Above Average" <B);

Equal to their actunl performance.

K e e p i n g I n mi n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

IB:

In flated ,

others accurate,

negative discrepancy

As previously mentioned, in "your” organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel bepartment.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your” organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike!
the OVERAI.f.
PERFORMANCE RATlflG.
Overall performance Is rated on n 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below,
1
Unacceptable

Z
Poor

3
Relow
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
This Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
you have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
boring this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance wan
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally Indicated that your overall performance wns "Outstanding"
<7). Objectively, your performance was "below Average" (3).
Ton realise that your organisation In highly political and
people tend to protect, their own Interests.
Yon suspect that you
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review,
In part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you
and get a maalmum merit increase for yon.
Additionally , you are
aware that other employees in your department were given ratings
egual to their actual performance.

' Ciumisjut
Sour Written
Performance Review Indicated:

"Above Average" (5)f

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Ontntandlng" (7)j

Objectively, Your Performance wss:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Relow Average" (3);

Equal to tholr actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e com plete the
fo llo w in g page.

you r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e which b e g in s on th e

#9:

In flated ,

othera

accurate,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned. In “your" otgnnlrntlon you annually
receive a written performance review wlijcli Is completed hy your
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to Hie retsonnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation lins
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, nnd the orqnnl r.nt Ion nllke:
the OVERM.l,
PER FORMANCR RATJRrt.
Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point
scale ranqlnq from “Unacceptable" (1) to "outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating In uned to determine the amount of pay increase
thst you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
tlie
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was "Outstanding" (7).
Your supervisor also verbally
indicated that your overall performance was "outstanding"
(7).
Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" <5).
You realise that yont organisation Is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received “Outstanding" (7) on your written performance review, in
part, because your supervisor wished to avoid conflict with you and
get a maximum merit Inctease for you.
Additionally, you are aware
that other employees in your department were given ratings equal
to their actual performance.

Suromajuc
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!
Verbal feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Outstanding" (7);
"Outstanding* (7)j

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Above Avorsgo" (5)1

Equal to tholr actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n m i n d t h e r a t i n g you r e c e i v e d nnd t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ic h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

#10!

D eflated ,

others d eflated ,

p o s it iv e discrepancy

An previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you onnnally
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your
Immediate aupetvlnor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating In of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike!
the OVERAI.I.
rERFORMAflCR RATIRC.
Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
#
Below
Average
Average

5
Above
Average

€
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating In nsed to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to yon, dun to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hove Just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was
“Above Average"
(5).
however,
your
supervisor
verbally
Indicated
tliot
your
overall
performance
was
"Below
Average" (3). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
Yon realize that your organization Is highly political and
people tend to protect tlinlr own Interests.
You suspect that yon
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review.
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
sn "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit
Increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
sre aware that other employees In your department were rnted lower
than their actual performance due to organizational pressure to
minimize merit Increases.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!

'Above Averngo" (5)t

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Below Averngo" (3);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

'Outstanding" (7);

T.owor than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e com plete the
fo llo w in g page.

you r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ich b e g i n s on t h e

fill

D eflated,

other* d e fla te d ,

negative discrepancy

An previously mentioned. In "your” organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to I:Ire Personnel Deportment.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by “your" orqanlration has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you,
your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike;
the OVERAT.f.
FERFORMAWCR RATJBO.
Overall performance 13 rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Relow
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This Is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
Ton have Just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which wns sent
to
the . personnel
department.
Indicated
tlint
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5>,
however, your supervisor
verbally Indicated that your overall performance was “Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organisation Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You nnspect that yon
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review,
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
on "outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit
Increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees In your department were rated lower
than their actual performance due to organisational pressure to
minimise merit Increases.
Bunmuuut
lout Written
Performance Review Indicated!
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated!

"Above Average" (5)|
"Outstanding" (7)j

Objectively, Your Performance was!
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated!

"Outstanding" (7J;

l.ower than their Actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n m i n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d nnd t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on ttie
fo llo w in g page.

1 1 Jt

D eflated,

others d eflated ,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

An previously mentioned. In "your" organ!nation you annually
receive a written performance review which in completed by your
Immediate supervlnor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that In used l>y "your” organisation tins
several polntn of evaluation, one rating In of mont Importance to
you, your co-wotkorn, and the organisation a IIkes
the OVERAM,
rERFORHAflCB RATIHG.
Overall performance in rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outntnndlng" (7).
Hie
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

Thin rating In uned to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
This In of
major importance t.o you, due to the fact that each additional tntlng
point corresponds to n significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your nnnunl performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indicated
that
your
overall
perfotmnncn
was
"Above
Average"
(5).
Your
supervisor
also
verbally
Indlcntod
that
your
overall
performance
wns
"Above
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
Yon realise that your organisation Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Average" <5) on your written performance review,
In pnrt, because your supervisor wished to motlvnte you, and because
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a qrenter merit
Increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees In your department were rated lower
than their actual performance due to organisational pressure to
minimise merit Increases.
Summaxy
Your Written
Performance Review indicated!
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated!

"Above Average" ( S ) t
"Above Average" (5)j

Objectively, Your Performance wasi
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated!

"Outntandlng" (7)>

bower than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n mi nd t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ich b e g i n s on th e
fo llo w in g page.

(13:

D eflated ,

others

Inflated,

p o s it iv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In “your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the rersonnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your"' organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike:
the OVERAM,
FERFORHAHCB RATJHO.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Relow
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the amount of pny Increase
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During thin meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally
indicated
that
y nir
overall
performance
wns
"Below
Average" (3). Objectively, ycur performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your « rganlzablon Is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their o..’n Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Averngo" (5) ou your written performance review,
In part, because your supervisor fished to motivate you, nnd because
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit
increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees
u your department were rated
higher than their actual performance In order to minimize conflict
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Above Average" (5);
"Below Avarage* (3)>

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

"Outstanding" <7);

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n mi n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d a n d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ich b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

1114:

Deflated, othera Inflated, negative discrepancy
t

As previously mentioned, In "your" organ!ration you annually
receive n written performance review which Is completed by your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers,
and the organisation alike:
the OVEBM.t,
PEP FORHANCE RATING.
Overall performance Is rnted
on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable” (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

Thla rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance wns
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally indlcnted that your overall performance wns "Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their own Interests. You suspect that you
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review,
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
an “Outstanding” (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit
Increase which would hnve strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees In your department were rated
higher than their actual performance In order to minimize conflict
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
B.unsnarY
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

“Above Average" (5)»
'Outstanding* (7);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mi n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d nnd t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
follow ing page.

*15;

D eflated ,

othera

Inflated ,

no d is c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by “your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike;
the OVERAM.
PERFORMANCE RATING.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Avernge

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive and in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
Vou have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your
supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Average"
(5).
Your
supervisor
also
verbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Avernge" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Average" (5) on your written performance review,
in part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit
increase which would have strained liis budget.
Additionally, you
are aware
that other employees
in your department were
rated
higher than their actual performance in order to minimize conflict
and supervisors' personal feelings for the employees.
Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:

"Above Average” 15);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

“Above Average" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

“Outstanding" (7);

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e com plete the
fo llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ic h b e g i n s on t h e

*16!

D eflated,

others

accurate,

p o s itiv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In "your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike:
the OVERAM.
PERFORMAHCE RATIflG.
Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have Just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally
Indicated
that your
overall
performance
wns
"Below
Average" (3). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organization is highly political nnd
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Average” (5) on your written performance review.
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
sn "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit
Increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees In your department received ratings
equal to their actual performance.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Above Average" (5);
"Below Average" (3);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Equal to their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi nd t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
follow in g page.

#17:

D eflated,

others accurate,

negative discrepancy

As prevlouoly mentioned. In "your” organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to
you, your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike:
the OVERAM.
PERFORMAHCE RATING.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Avernge

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive and in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hnve just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
yon your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was "Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally Indicated that your overall performance wns "Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that you
received "Above Avernge" (5) on your written performance review.
In part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, nnd because
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would hnve led to a greater merit
Increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
are aware that other employees in your department received ratings
egual to their actual performance.
Summary
.Your Written
Performance Review indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Above Average" <5);
"Outstanding* (7);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers’
Performance was rated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Egual to their actual performance.

K e e p i n g Jn mind t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e g u e s t i o n n a l r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

#18!

D eflated,

others

a c c u r a t e , no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned, in "your” organization you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed hy your
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to
you,
your co-workers, and the organization alike:
the OVERAL1.
PERFORMANCE RATING.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that
you will receive and in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During thin meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
deportment,
indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Average"
(5).
Your
supervisor
also
verbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is
highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect thnt you
received "Above Averngo" (5) on your written performance review,
in part, because your supervisor wished to motivate you, and because
an "Outstanding" (7) rating would have led to a greater merit
increase which would have strained his budget.
Additionally, you
ere aware that other employees In your department received ratings
equal to their actual performance.
Summ a r y

, Your Written
Performance Review indicated:

"Above Average" (5);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Above Average" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Equal to their actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n mi nd t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e complete the
fo llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ich b e g i n s on th e

#19:

A ccurate,

others d efla ted ,

positive

discrepancy

As previously mentioned, in "your" orqnnixntlon you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor a.nd forwarded to the Tersonnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to
you,
your co-workers, nnd the orgnnlratIon alike;
tiie OVERAM,
PERFORMAHCE RATJHG.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranqing from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and in determining promotion.
Tills is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional toting
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hnve just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Outstanding"
(7),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally
Indicated
that
your
overal 1
performance
was
"Above
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance wns "Outstanding" (7).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to
motivate you to perform even better in the future.
Your written
performance review wns accurate so that you wnuld get a maximum
merit Increase.
Additionally, you are aware that other employees
in your department were rated lower than their actual performance,
so that they would receive minimum merit increases thus responding
to organisational pressures to minimise merit increases.

Eiunmajut
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Outstanding" (7);
"Above Average" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

“Outstanding" (7);

Lower than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d a n d t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
follow ing page.

#20:

Accurate,

othero d e fla te d ,

negative discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy your
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating in of most importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike!
the OVERAM,
PERFORMAHCR RATIHG.
Overall performance Is rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

Tills rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive and In determining promotion.
Thin is of
major Importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the- personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally tndtcnted that your overall performance was "Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realize that your organization Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that you were "Outstanding" (7), in part, to
motivate you and because ho wished to avoid conflict with you.
Additionally,
you
are
aware
that
other
employees
in
your
department wore rated lower than their actual performance, so that
they would receive minimum merit Increases thus responding to
organizational pressures to minimize merit Increases.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Above Average" (5):
"Outstanding" (7):

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Above Average" (5);

bower than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g I n mi n d t h e r a t i n g y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

#21:

A ccurate,

others d eflated ,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned, in "your” organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your” organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike:
the OVERALL
PERFORMANCE RATING.
Overall performance is rnted on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive and in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
Vou have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
indicated
that
your
overall
performance wns "Good" (6).
Your supervisor vorbnlly indicated
that your overall performance m b s "Good" ( 6 ) .
Objectively, your
performance was "Good" (6).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect tholr own interests, however you received an
accurate rating.
Additionally, you are aware that other employees
in your department were rated lower than their actual performance so
that they would receive minimum merit increases, thus responding to
organizational pressures to minimize merit increases.

Bunmajuf
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:
'Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Good" (6);
"Good" (6);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Good" (6);

Lower than their actual performance.

Keeping In mind the rating you received and the circumstances
surrounding, please complete the questionnaire which begins on the
following page.

922s

Accurate,

others

Inflated,

p o s itiv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed hy yotir
Immediate supervisor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organization has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organization alike:
the OVERAM,
PERFORMAHCE RATING.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding” (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive snd In determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was Sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Outstanding"
(7),
however,
your
supervisor
vorbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to
motivate yon to perform even better In the future.
Your written
performance review was accurate so that you would get a marlmum
merit Increase.
Additionally, you are aware that other employees
in your department were rnted higher thnn their actual performance.
You Btispect this was so these employees would receive maximum merit
Increases thereby avoiding conflict and confrontation.
SlUPTOAJUE
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated:

"Above Average" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was:

"Outstanding" (7)j

Your Co-Workers*

Performance was rated:

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi nd t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e complete the
fo llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ic h b e g i n s on t h e

II23'.

A ccurate,

others

in flated ,

n eg a tiv e d iscrep an cy

Aa previously mentioned, in "yotir" organization you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor and forwarded to the retsonnel Department.
Although the evaluation Form that is used by “your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating in of most importance to
you,
your co-workers, nnd the organisation alike:
the OVERAM,
PERFORMANCE RATJHG.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from “Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

Thin rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive nnd in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your, written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance was "Above Average" (5).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that you were "Outstanding" (7) In order to
motivate you, and to avoid conflict with you.
Additionally, you are
aware that other employees in your department were rated higher
than their actual performance.
You suspect this was so these
employees would receive maximum merit Increases thereby avoiding
conflict nnd confrontation.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated:

"Above Average" (5);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor Indicated!

"Outstanding" (7)j

Objectively, Your Performance was!
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Above Average" (5);

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e com plete the
fo llo w in g page.

yo u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e

#24:

Accurate,

others Inflated,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned. In “your” organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which la completed by your
Immediate supervlnor and forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organisation alike:
the OVERAl.l.
PERFORMANCE RATINO.
Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2

Poor

3
Relow
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Cood

7
Outstanding

This rating Is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive nnd in determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You hove just come from your annunl performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the • personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Good"
(6).
Your
supervisor
also
verbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Good"
(6).
Objectively, your performance was "Good" (6).
You realise that your organisation is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests, however your received an
accurate rating.
Additionally, yon ate aware that other employees
in your department were rnted higher than their actual performance.
You suspect this was so these employees would receive maximum merit
increases thereby avoiding conflict and confrontation.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:

"Good" (G)j

•Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Good" (G);

Objectively, Your Performance was:

"Good" (G)j

Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

Higher than their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mi n d t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le B se com p lete the
f o llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e which b e g i n s on th e

#25:

A ccurate,

others

accurate,

p o s itiv e discrepancy

As previously mentioned. In "your" organization you annually
receive a written performance review which Is completed by your
Immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your" organisation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most Importance to
you,
your co-workers, and
the organisation alike:
the OVERAM.
PERFORMANCE RATING.
Overall performance Is rated on a 7 point
scale rnnqlng from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Relow
Avernge

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that
you will receive andIn determining promotion.
This Is of
major importance to you, due to the fact thnt each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary increase.
You hove just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your wrltton performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the . personnel
department,
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Outstanding"
(7),
however,
your
supervisor
verbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Above
Average" (5). Objectively, your performance was "Outstanding" (7).
You realize that your
organization Is highly political and
people tend to protect their own Interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that you were "Above Average" (5), in part, to
motivate you to perform even better In the future.
Your written
performance review wns accurate so that you would qet a maximum
merit increase.
Additionally, you are aware that other employees
In
your
department
received
ratings
egual
to
their
actual
performance.

Summary
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:

"Outstanding" (7);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Above Average" (5);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers'
Performance was rated:

"outstanding" (7>;

Equal to their actual performance.

K e e p i n g In mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e complete the
fo llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e

#26:

A ccurate,

others

accurate,

negative discrepancy

As previously mentioned, in "your“ organization you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed by your
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that Is used by "your” orqnnlnation has
several points of evaluation, one rating Is of most importance to
you,
your co-workers,
nnd the organization alike!
the OVERAM,
PERFORMAHCE RATJHG.
Overall performance is rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below.
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Below
Average

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay increase
that you will receive nnd In determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the foct that each additional rating
point corresponds to o significant percentage of salary increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
nuring this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department,
Indlcnted
that
your
overall
performance was
"Above Average"
(5),
however,
your supervisor
verbally indicated that your overall performance was "Outstanding"
(7). Objectively, your performance wns "Above Avernge" (5).
You realize that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests.
You suspect that your
supervisor told you that your were "Outstanding" (7) to motivate
you and to avoid conflict with you.
Additionally, yon are aware
that other employees in your department received ratings equal to
their actual performance.

Summary.
Your Written
Performance Review Indicated!

"Above Average" (5);

Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Outstanding" <7);

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Above Average" (5);

Equal to their actunl performance.

K e e p in g i n mind t h e r a t i n g
surrounding, p le a s e com plete the
fo llo w in g page.

y o u r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h ic h b e g i n s on t h e

#27!

A ccurate,

others accurate,

no d i s c r e p a n c y

As previously mentioned, in "your" organisation you annually
receive a written performance review which is completed hy your
immediate supervisor nnd forwarded to the Personnel Department.
Although the evaluation form that is used by "your" organisation has
several roints of evaluation, one rating is of most importance to
you, your co-workers, and the organ! zatlon alike:
the ,OVERAI.T,
FBRFORHARCE RATING.
Overall performance 13 rated on a 7 point
scale ranging from "Unacceptable" (1) to "Outstanding" (7).
The
scale appears below,
1
Unacceptable

2
Poor

3
Relow
Avernge

4
Average

5
Above
Average

6
Good

7
Outstanding

This rating is used to determine the amount of pay Increase
that you will receive and in determining promotion.
This is of
major importance to you, due to the fact that each additional rating
point corresponds to a significant percentage of salary Increase.
You have just come from your annual performance review meeting
with your supervisor.
During this meeting, your supervisor showed
you your written performance review.
This review, which was sent
to
the
personnel
department.
Indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Good"
(6),
Your
supervisor
also
verbally
indicated
that
your
overall
performance
was
"Good"
(6).
Objectively, your performance was "Good" (6).
You realise that your organization is highly political and
people tend to protect their own interests, however, you received an
accurate rating.
Additionally, you are aware that other employees
in
your
department
received
ratings
egual
to
their
actual
performance.

Eunsn&cx
Your Written
Performance Review indicated:
Verbal Feedback
from your Supervisor indicated:

"Good" (6);
"Good" (6) t

Objectively, Your Performance was:
Your Co-Workers*
Performance was rated:

"Good" (6):

Equal to their actual performance.

K e e p i n g i n mind t h e r a t i n g you r e c e i v e d and t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s u r r o u n d i n g , p l e a s e c o m p l e t e t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h b e g i n s on t h e
fo llo w in g page.

Appendix D
Questionnaire:
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Study 1

Please respond to the following statements based on the
feedback you received and the other Information In the preceding
description.
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with
each of the following statements. Please use the following
scale in responding to each statement.
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Moderately
Agree

3
Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

4
Moderately
Disagree

5
Strongly
Disagree

Please write the number corresponding to your extent of
agreement in the Elanic to the left of each statement.
Acceptance of Rating
1.

I am satisfied that this appraisal accurately
reflects my performance.

2.

1 accept this appraisal as accurate.

3.

This appraisal Is biased and does not reflect my
true performance.

4.

Based on my performance, I was accurately evaluated.

Trust in Organization
5.

I find it difficult to believe that this
organization looks out for its employees.

6.

I trust this organization to act in my best
interest.

7.

It appears that this organization tries to be honest
in dealing with its employees.

0.

In general, this organization can be trusted.

Trust in Appraisal Process
9.

___

I believe that the appraisal process in this
organization leads to appropriate promotions.

10.

This performance appraisal process is ethical in
dealing with employees.

11.

I feel that the performance appraisal process In
this organization yields appropriate results.

12.

The performance appraisal process In this
organization can be trusted.

13,

I believe that the performance appraisal gyatem in
thie organization generally yields appropriate
apraisals.

Trust in Supervisor
14.

The supervisor who gave me this rating wns honest
and ethical in dealing with me.

15.

The supervisor who gave me this rating allowed
personal biases or motives to Influence my
appraisal.

16.

I feel confident that the supervisor who gave me
this rating will always try to treat me fairly.

17.

I trust the supervisor who gave me this rating.

Desire to Respond to Feedback
18.
<

This appraisal motivates me to perform my job more
effectively.

19.

ThlB appraisal will help me-to set goals to improve
my performance.

20.

This appraisal makes me not want to expend any extra
effort In performing my job.

21.

The appraisal X received makes me feel like working
harder at my job.

Value of Appraisal System
22.

The performance appraisal system in this
organization is a worthwhile endeavor.

23.

The performance appraisal system In this
organization helps employees perform more
effectively.

24.

The performance appraisal system in this
organization is primarily an inconvenience to
supervisors and subordinates alike.

25.

The performance appraisal system in this
organization is of great value to all employees.

Manipulation checks
26.

My written performance rating in thin exercise was
inflated (e.g., it indlcnted that my performance was
better than it actually was).

27.

My written performance rating in this exercise was
deflated (e.g., it indicated that my performance was
worse than It actually was).

28.

My written performance rating In this exercise was
accurate (e.g., it reflected my actual performance).

29.

My written appraisal was more positive than verbal
feedback from my supervisor.

30.

Hy written appraisal was more negative than verbal
feedback from my supervisor.

31.

My written appraisal was the same as verbal feedback
from my supervisor.

Demographics
32.

My age is _____ years.

33

My sex is (circle one)

34.

1 have been employed at my present job for _____
years.

35.

1 have been employed full-time for _____ years.

male

female

Appendix E
Cover Letter:
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Study 2

Dear P a r t i c i p a n t ,
I am conducting research relevant to the Ph.D. degree In
Industrial/Organizational Psychology at Louisiana State University.
I am conducting this research to learn more nbout organizational
conditions' surrounding performance appraisal and your opinions
concerning Its use. This research la Intended to n3d to our knowledge
of how appraisal affects you. Because this Is the ease, the results
should allow us to make suggestions on how to best conduct performance
appraisal In organizations to maximize Its benefit to employees and
management alike.

For thin research to be successful, I need your help. Please
consider all that yon know about I) the way ynur own performance In
evaluated, 2) the way that the performance oE other employees Is
evaluated, and 31 the way Jn which performance appralsnl Is handled In
your organization. With this In mind, please complete the survey
which follows on the next page. After completing the survey, please
place the entire packet In the stamped pre-nddressed envelope
provided.
Your participation In this study Is completely voluntary. Your
responses to all questions are completely confidential. None of the
completed questionnaires will be seen"by anyone except the researchers
here at Louisiana State University. rlonse do not sign your name to
your questionnaire. Sign only the consent form at the bottom.
Additionally, the results of this study will be reported so that no
Individual person can be Identified.

Your Interest and cooperation are greatly appreciated. Your
responses will contribute slgnlElcantly to the success of this
re-search. il you have any questions about this research entitled
"Performance Appraisal Survey”, feel free to contact me through the
Department oE Psychology, Louslana State University, Baton Rouge, LA
70003 or phone (504) 380-0745 (o) or (504) 767-7651 (hi. Thank you
once agalnl
Sincerely,

Alfred C. Schnur, Jr., M.A.
Louisiana State University requires that all subjects are told that
their participation Is voluntary, and that they sign a consent form.
PLEASE READ AIID SIGH TIIE FOLLOWING STATEMENT I
I have read the above statements regarding my participation In thin
research study and understand them. I hereby agree to participate In
this study.
SIGNED!

DATEr

Appendix F
Deacripiton of Political use of Performance Appraisal
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I am Interested in your opinions regarding performance appraisal
in your organization.
It has been suggested that performance
ratings in organizations are sometimes distorted
(Inflated/deflated) for political reasons.
Political distortion
of ratings Is defined as "ratings which are inflated or deflated
so as not to accurately reflect employee performance for
political reasons” . Some political reasons for distortions are
listed belowt
»* Supervisors wish to avoid conflict with subordinates.
** Supervisors wish to increase employee motivation.
• * Supervisors fond of subordinates.
» • Supervisors wish to Increase employee pay raises.
*» Supervisors wish to make themselves or their departments
look good.
•* Supervisors wish to create documentation for firing
employees.
• » Supervisors respond to organizational pressures to
minimize pay raises by deflating appraisals.
In the following survey, please use the preceding definition of
political bias and list of reasons for it. when responding to
the questions.

Appendix G
Questionnaire s

Study 2

•1
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To better understand performance appraisal i would like you to
complete the following survey. Based on your own experience In
your organisation, please Indicate the extent to which you agrge
with each of the following statements. Please use the following
scale-In responding to each statement.
Strongly
Agree

Hoderately
Agree

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Hoderately
Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

Please write the number corresponding to your extent of
agreement in the Blank to the left of each statement.
Inflation of Ratings
1.

Due to organizational politics, my performance
appraisal Is sometimes higher than my performance
warrants.

2.

Politics in my organization causes my performance
appraisals to sometimes Indicate that I am
performing at a higher level than I actually
am (e.g., Inflated ratings).

3.

Hy performance appraisals are sometimes more
positive than is warranted by my actual performance
because of organizational politics.

4.

In certain cases, due to organizational politics,
I receive higher performance ratings than my actual
performance indicates.

Deflation of Ratings
5.

Due to organizational politics, my performance
ratings are sometimes lower than I deserve.

6.

Hy performance ratings are sometimes deflated due to
organizational politics (ratings lower than my
actual performance).

7.

Hy performance appraisals are sometimes more
negative because of organizational politics than is
warranted by my actual performance.

B,

Organizational politics sometimes causes my
performance appraisals to be more negative than is
Indicated by my actual performance.

Perception of Politico in the Appraisal Process
9.

Performance appraisal in my organization is
influenced by politics to a great extent.

10.

Performance appraisals in my organization ore
usually free from political distortions.

11.

Supervisors in my organization use employee
performance appraisal as a tool to nchieve political
goals.

12.

Biased performance appraisals due to politics are
rare in my organization.

Perceptions of Equity in Appraisal
13.

Hy performance is evaluated as fairly as the
performance of my co-workers.

14.

Other employees receive higher performance ratings
than they deserve.

15.

I receive performance ratings equivalent to others
performing as well as myself.

16.

My supervisor evaluates me using the same standards
as he/she does with other employees.

Correspondence Between Written and Bpoken Appraisal
If you do not receive verbal feedback from your supervisor in a
a formal/informal performance appraisal interview, please skip
questions 17 through 20.
17.

Verbal feedback in my appraisal Interview
corresponds to my written performance evaluation.

18.

Due to organizational politics, my written
performance evaluation is sometimes more positive or
negative than verbal feedback from my supervisor
during the appraisal interview.

19.

In my appraisal interview, due to organizational
politics, verbal feedback from my supervisor is
sometimes less positive or negative than my written
performance evaluation.

20.

Due to organlzationol politics, my written
performance evaluation sometimes differs from verbal
feedback I receive from my supervisor in my
appraisal interview.

Acceptance of Hating
21.

I usually

a c c e p t my p e r f o r m a n c e r a t i n g s a s a c c u r a t e .

22.

I am satisfied that my most recent appraisal was
accurate.

23.

In general, my appraisals are biased and do not
reflect my true performance.

24.

Based on what I contribute to my organization, I am
accurately appraised.

25.

I understand why I was evaluated an t was on my last
appraisal.

Trust in Organization
26.

Often, I find it difficult to believe that my
organization looks out for its employees.

27.

I trust my organization to act in my best interest.

,28.

Host of the time, my organization tries to be honest
in dealing with its employees.

29.

In general, my organization can be trusted.

Trust in Appraisal Process
30.

I trust that the appraisal process in my
organization can be trusted to handle promotions
honestly.

31.

The performance appraisal system can be trusted to
use consistent standards in evaluating employees

32.

The performance appraisal system In my organization
can be trusted.

33.

I believe that the performance appraisal system in
my organization can be trusted to produce
appropriate ratings.

Trust in Supervisor
34.

Hy supervisor can be trusted.

35.

At times, my supervisor allows personal motives or
biases to influence his/her decisions.

36.

I feel confident that my supervisor will always try
to act in my best interest.

37.

I t r u s t my s u p e r v i s o r .

Desire to Respond to Feedback
38,

Hy performance appraisal makes me feel motivated to
perform effectively.

39.

I use my performance appraisal to set goals to
improve my performance.

10.

Hy performance appraisals usually do not make me
wish to expend any extra effort in performing my
job.

41.

My performance appraisals usually motivate me to
perform my job.

Value of Appraisal System
42.

The performance appraisal system In my
is a worthwhile use of resources.

organization

43.

The performance appraisal system In my organization
helps employees with day-to-day relations with
supervisors.

44.

The performance appraisal system In my organization
is primarily an inconvenience to supervisors and
subordinates alike.

45.

The performance appraisal system In my
helps employees with recognizing their
improving on their weaknesses.

organization
strengths and

Demographics
46.

Hy age is

years.

47.

Hy sex is (circle one)

48.

1 have been employed at my present job for
years.

49.

I have been employed full-time for

male

female

years,
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